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Abstract
This dissertation describes the verification and validation of methods for producing
radiation protection factors (RPFs) using experiments and Monte Carlo N-Particle 6
(MCNP6) simulations. RPF validation of a steel enclosure using a plutonium-beryllium
source produced a validated RPF of 1.187 ± 0.003, with statistically significant agreement
between neutron MCNP6 models and experiments and a gamma protection factor (GPF)
with statistically significant agreement to the measured GPF with a 95% confidence
interval. Efforts to validate more complex enclosures using the Fast Burst Reactor (FBR)
yielded the first-ever direct measurements of this reactor’s prompt gamma emission
spectrum and revealed irreconcilable differences between the FBR facility-provided source
spectrum and spectrometer measurements, resulting in modeled GPFs 27% to 106% higher
than experimental GPFs. The use of a tallying annulus reduced the variance in simulations
of the FBR’s projected radiation field by three orders of magnitude. Annulus-based tallying
enabled the demonstration of a nuclear weapon-like irradiation of a target at 1400 meters,
yielding statistically significant gamma and neutron flux spectra in 36 hours using a laptop
computer with an i7-4700MQ processor. The effects of different simulation and calculation
methods on RPFs are examined and discussed, along with recommendations and lessons
learned for future work.
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VERIFICATION AND VALIDATION OF RADIATION PROTECTION
FACTORS FROM MONTE CARLO SIMULATIONS

I. Introduction
Shortly after the discovery of radioactivity in 1896, evidence of negative health
effects from ionizing radiation surfaced as X-rays became widely used [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]. In
subsequent years, humanity became increasingly aware of the dangers associated with
ionizing radiation. A vast body of research has consistently demonstrated that doses above
200 mSv of penetrating ionizing radiation present measurable health risks to personnel,
and protection standards have become more specific and more restrictive with time by
various authorities on the matter since these risks became apparent [6, 7, 8, 9, 10]. Two
modern standards dominate radiation dosimetry: those of the International Commission on
Radiological Protection and those of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
For nearly a half century after the discovery of radioactivity, the threat of ionizing
radiation was limited to people working in the field of X-ray research, people working with
medical equipment, and people working in a few industrial applications. Although the
military used radioactive radium in dials and watches as early as World War I [11],
weaponized radiation only became a practical option with the success of the Manhattan
Project in 1945. For the first time, a deliverable weapon could kill many thousands using
ionizing radiation.
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1.1 Weaponized Radiation and Military Vulnerability Studies
The short-term, acute effects of radiation are widely known and documented.
Figure 1 illustrates these risks, as well as excess cancer risk observed in atomic bomb
survivors. An dose of 1 Gray or 100 rads can cause acute radiation sickness, including
vomiting, weakness, and an increased susceptibility to infection for 24 hours, with some
residual effects lasting as long as a month, but is not generally fatal by itself [12]. The
number of symptoms, their severity, and the likelihood of death increase with higher doses,
with a 10 Gray dose killing nearly 100% of patients, even with modern medical treatment.

Figure 1. Mortality vs Dose for acute radiation syndrome with treatment, recreated from
Merck (left) [13], and Excess Cancer Risk vs Equivalent Dose for Atomic Bomb Survivors,
recreated from Preston (right) [14].

Even spread out over time, radiation doses can lower life expectancy and reduce
quality of life by increasing cancer risks, and no threshold dose or dose rate at which these
risks begin has been established [15]. Although recent research has shown that populations
in areas of high background radiation tend to live 2.5 years longer than populations in areas
of low background radiation [16], the risk posed by low-dose radiation is a subject of
contentious debate among health physicists. Social and psychological factors driven by
2

radiophobia can compound risk from actual exposures; simply working near a major
nuclear event is associated with stigmas, anxiety, depression, suicide, and post-traumatic
stress [17]. These effects gave rise to serious concerns in the United States military after
the successful Soviet nuclear weapon test of 1949.
During the nuclear arms race of the Cold War, the United States investigated the
threats of penetrating ionizing radiation through robust experimentation and several
modeling methods. These efforts included nuclear weapon tests, dedicated radiation test
facilities, and three methods of mathematical modeling [18, 19, 20]. Chapter 2 describes
these efforts in more detail. In the decade following the fall of the Soviet Union, the
majority of these dedicated test facilities closed. However, several international
developments since the end of the Cold War have led to a renewed interest in assessing the
situational threats of ionizing radiation. These developments include proliferation and
nuclear weapons tests by Pakistan and India, nuclear weapons tests by North Korea, and
an ambitious Iranian nuclear program. These resurgent nuclear threats, however, have not
led to renewed funding for nuclear vulnerability test facilities [21]. Without the irradiation
facilities available to previous generations, understanding of the degree of protection
provided by the U.S. military’s fleet of vehicles has atrophied as the Department of Defense
has replaced older vehicle designs and models.
Post Cold War: Rising Tensions, Renewed Interest, Fewer Resources
This lack of understanding became uncomfortably clear during the United States’
emergency relief efforts to Japan following the massive earthquake and tsunami in the
spring of 2011. When operational leaders requested radiation protection information for
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their vehicles and shelters, none was available because the Department of Defense no
longer required the Army to acquire or catalogue that information. Radiation protection
data had been eliminated as a cost-cutting measure [21, 22]. As a result, operational leaders
had to make radiation risk management decisions with inadequate knowledge of
vulnerabilities. This incident demonstrated that radiation threats to military personnel are
not unique to the nuclear battlefield.
In response, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) and US Army Nuclear
and Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Agency (USANCA) are funding a longterm plan to assess the radiation protection provided by modern Army vehicles to their
crews and passengers. However, neither agency has the resources to recreate the radiation
testing infrastructure of the Cold War. Accordingly, the focus of this assessment plan has
shifted away from pure experimentation.
Although current radiation test facilities cannot support robust radiation protection
experiments, developing technology may allow for radiation protection evaluations by
computer modeling. Modern computers allow for approximately nine orders of magnitude
more calculations per second than computers of the Cold War [23]. Figure 2 shows
unabated, exponential growth in the world’s fastest computers since the early 1960s. If
radiation models can reproduce experimental reality to an acceptable tolerance, then those
simulations could provide a cheaper, faster, and more flexible alternative to radiation
testing facilities. Since 2011, The Defense Threat Reduction Agency has been investigating
the utility of Monte Carlo N-Particle version 6.1 (MCNP6.1) to produce radiation
protection factors in lieu of extensive and expensive radiation testing programs [22].

4

Figure 2. Processing speed of the world's fastest computers by year. Recreated from Top 500
data [23].

Developments since the inception of this radiation protection assessment plan
underscore its importance. In addition to further nuclear weapons tests by North Korea,
tensions with Russia have been marked by breakdowns in nuclear cooperative agreements
and heightened international tensions. Russia’s nuclear posturing has included exercising
strategic weapons platforms near the borders of the United States [24, 25], ending several
cooperative agreements on reducing both nations’ stockpiles of highly-enriched uranium
and weapons-grade nuclear fuels [26, 27], and breaking the Intermediate-Range Nuclear
Forces (INF) Treaty by deploying a battalion of medium-range ground-launched cruise
missiles [28]. Chinese nuclear modernization, Iran’s nuclear ambitions, and the threat of
nuclear terrorism have also contributed to an increased national focus on nuclear threats.
President Trump publicly stated his intention to strengthen and expand nuclear capability
and voiced concerns about an unstable global mindset on the subject of nuclear weapons
5

[29], and the 2018 Nuclear Policy Review lists “Achievement of U.S. objectives if
deterrence fails” as a critical role in U.S. national security strategy [30]. Strengthening and
expanding the United States’ nuclear capability and achieving U.S. objectives if deterrence
fails depends on understanding the military’s nuclear vulnerabilities and protection
measures.
1.2 Problem Statement
The purpose of this research is to develop and validate a method for determining
the radiation protection factor provided by a shielding vehicle to personnel within against
externally applied gamma and neutron radiation fields using MCNP6.
MCNP6 is a general-purpose Monte Carlo N-Particle code that models radiation
transport in three-dimensional geometries. Written in FORTRAN, the program is the latest
in a continual development effort by Los Alamos National Laboratory dating back to the
1950s [31].
A Radiation Protection Factor (RPF) is a unit-less number describing the relative
benefit provided by a shielding structure in reducing the acute health effects of ionizing
radiation. Higher RPFs are associated with greater protection and lower doses so that, from
the perspective of a shielded person, bigger is better.
For the purposes of this research, the types of ionizing radiation investigated are
limited to gamma radiation and neutron radiation. Although alpha and beta radiation can
produce health effects, they can be effectively shielded with skin and clothing at energies
associated with nuclear explosions and radioactive materials. Alpha and beta radiation is
most threatening in the form of contaminating radioactive residue and fallout that is inhaled
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or ingested. Rudimentary protective measures such as clothing, gloves, good hygiene, and
a high-filtration respirator can effectively manage these risks. However, such protection
measures are useless against gamma and neutron radiation, which requires larger and more
massive shielding than is practical for worn equipment. A vehicle, however, can offer some
protection from neutron and gamma radiation. This protection is important for radiation
health effects, which come in two general categories: short-term deterministic effects and
long-term stochastic risks. Table 1 provides a useful reference for the properties, terms,
and primary health threats associated with each category of radiation health effects.

Table 1. Categories and terms of radiation health effects and their associated properties,
units, and health threats, recreated with information from Cember [15].

When considering radiation health effects, most regulations and guidance focus on
long-term cancer risks and reducing doses in accordance with the well-known concept of
“as low as reasonably achievable” or ALARA. These stochastic risks are quantified by the
dose quantities of equivalent dose and dose equivalent, both in units of sieverts and rem,
7

and they account for the tendency of doses from radiation types with high linear energy
transfers, such as neutrons, to cause higher risks of cancer than radiation types with more
diffuse energy deposition such as gamma rays. Equivalent doses under 0.5 sieverts have
no symptoms that are likely to impede personnel effectiveness in a physical sense.
However, concerns about health risks from exposure to radiation disasters and nuclear
attack stemming from persistent myths and misperceptions about the threat of radiation
have been shown to cause significant psychological issues including depression, anxiety,
and paralyzing fatalism [32, 33]. Reliable information on a vehicle crew’s protection from
radiation effects may help to address and assuage these concerns and increase crew
effectiveness in elevated radiation fields.
While the long-term stochastic health risks of ionizing radiation doses are an
important field of research in their own right, it is the short-term threat of acute radiation
syndrome that is of foremost concern to both military operations and nuclear disaster
response. Whether in a tactical situation or an emergent lifesaving disaster response, the
primary concern of military forces is the accomplishment of the mission, and it is the acute
dose as measured in gray that poses a physical threat to the ability of personnel to execute
the mission. Thus, both dose in grays and equivalent dose in sieverts are important for this
work, and differences between radiation protection factors computed by each method merit
investigation and comparison.
1.3 Research Goals and Objectives
This project has three goals and eight total supporting objectives.
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1. Create a RPF evaluation method that uses experimentally-validated MCNP6
simulations.
a. Establish MCNP6 neutron transport validation techniques.
b. Establish MCNP6 gamma transport validation techniques.
c. Establish a procedure for normalizing the gamma and neutron dose
components in a simulated scenario.
d. Establish a procedure for computing the resulting doses and total RPF.
2. Demonstrate this method on a series of surrogates using a plutonium-beryllium
(PuBe) source and a nuclear reactor.
a. Measure and validate the gamma emission spectrum of the fast burst reactor
(FBR).
b. Demonstrate the RPF method on a simple steel surrogate.
c. Demonstrate the RPF method on a three-material surrogate.
d. Demonstrate the RPF method on a complex geometry surrogate.
3. Build a computer model of a Stryker vehicle irradiated by a nuclear weapon
spectrum in Software for Optimization of Radiation Detectors (SWORD) and run
it in MCNP6.

Several terms used in these goals and supporting objectives will be explained in
more detail in later chapters. The RPF evaluation method consists of a series of simulations
and computations that can be validated with neutron and gamma irradiation experiments.
The principles behind this method will be described in Chapter 2, and the overall algorithm
will be described in detail in Chapter 3. Although MCNP6 is distributed with VisEd, a
9

geometry visualization program, it can be difficult to ascertain from VisEd whether
complicated geometries in simulations are adequately described in an MCNP6 input deck.
One solution to this is using SWORD, a program allowing 3-dimensional visualization and
construction of a virtual radiation environment and subsequent input deck building for
MCNP6 simulations. The PuBe source is a radioactive source that emits neutrons and
gamma rays. The surrogates described are box-like constructions of varying sizes, wall
thicknesses, and materials which allow nuclear instrumentation to detect gamma and
neutron fluxes within their enclosures.
In addition to its overall purpose, this dissertation includes several contributions to
the field of nuclear engineering. The first is an experimentally-validated MCNP6 RPF
assessment of a steel enclosure that combines gamma and neutron radiation simulations
and measurements. The second is the first-ever direct measurement of the FBR’s gamma
output spectrum and an evaluation of its gamma emission spectrum. The third is a method
of conducting RPF assessments of nuclear strikes against newer types and models of
tactical vehicles which the U.S. Army has not experimentally assessed for radiation
protection due to their development and fielding after the Cold War.
One of these goals has already been accomplished in preliminary work. MCNP6
neutron protection factors (NPFs) were validated on a simple steel enclosure using a PuBe
source, a deuterium-deuterium (D-D) neutron generator, and the Fast Burst Reactor (FBR)
at White Sands Missile Range [34]. Gamma protection factors (GPFs) were validated on a
simple steel enclosure using radioisotopes and the FBR [35]. Much of this research, as well
as parallel efforts across DoD, have already been published [22, 36, 37, 38].
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1.4 Investigative Questions
Pursuant to the goals and objectives, several key questions were investigated:
1. What are the steps involved in producing a RPF for a given scenario using
MCNP6?
2. How reliably can MCNP6 transport gamma and neutron radiation in various
shielding scenarios, and how should this reliability be enumerated?
3. What additional considerations and techniques are necessary to produce a
reasonably reliable RPF for a given scenario within practical limits of
computational power and time?

11

II. Background and Theory

2.1 Radiation Protection Research during the Cold War
A reasonable starting point for considering the protection offered by military
vehicles to personnel is historical examples. However, the effects of the bombings on
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, though well documented, offer little insight into the relative
vulnerability of military formations to nuclear weapons. Although we can infer some
effects information regarding the vulnerability of personnel with no obstructing shielding
between themselves and the fireball, the majority of shielded personnel were inside
buildings, not armored military vehicles. Furthermore, in the case of the Hiroshima
bombing, the light wood and paper construction of most of the buildings in the city led to
firestorm conditions which killed a great number of people. Coupled with the blast,
thermal, and secondary effects of the explosions, these made for a combination of
confounding variables that would take decades of determined study to characterize and
isolate from the specific health effects of nuclear weapon radiation [39]. As a result, in the
late 1940s, the U.S. military faced a substantial lack of information on their vulnerabilities
to the unique radiation effects of the atomic bomb.
Following the war, the Navy sought to investigate the effects of nuclear weapons
on naval vessels in a three-shot series named Operation Crossroads. The intent of
Crossroads was to demonstrate the fleet’s survivability and resilience against nuclear
weapons. The blast and thermal effects of the air-dropped weapon test, Able, sank five
ships and caused damage and fires on an additional fourteen. The prompt radiation from
this explosion killed about 50% more of the test animals than other effects. Of particular
12

note was the case of the battleship Nevada, which survived the blast without sinking, but
suffered 100% test animal casualties from the prompt radiation. The second test, Baker,
was detonated 30 meters underwater, and the relative effects of radiation were even more
pronounced. The blast and hydrodynamic effects sank nine ships, but more importantly,
every target ship became almost irreversibly contaminated, and nearly every test animal
died of acute radiation effects. Attempts to decontaminate most of the target ships were
aborted after dozens of personnel took unacceptably high doses, and the third Crossroads
test was cancelled. Most of the target ships had to be scuttled rather than scrapped, and
many of the support vessels required extensive decontamination before returning to service
[40]. Both Crossroads tests demonstrated the vulnerability of a vehicle’s crew, and how an
otherwise fully mission-capable vehicle may be unusable or unsafe for extended periods
after withstanding a nuclear bombardment.
Understanding the vulnerability of military formations to nuclear weapons became
especially important in 1949, when the Soviet Union detonated its first nuclear weapon.
The U.S. Army conducted its first military effects testing during the Buster-Jangle series
of nuclear weapons tests at the Nevada Test Site in 1951. Military exercises in conjunction
with nuclear tests became a regular feature at the Nevada Test Site for the rest of the 1950s,
with formations of soldiers maneuvering around and observing test explosions during
operations Tumbler-Snapper, Upshot Knothole, Teapot, and Plumbob. Many of these tests
included examining radiation effects on surrogate animals. The last U.S. nuclear weapons
tests during Operation Sunbeam evaluated several tactical nuclear weapons. From this
point on, the Partial Test Ban Treaty was in effect, and further radiation vulnerability
research required a different approach [41].
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One test from this era was particularly notable for demonstrating the capability of
armored vehicles to operate in a nuclear battlefield: the Apple 2 test at the Nevada Test
Site during Operation Teapot in 1955. Immediately after a 29 kT detonation atop a 500foot tower, approximately 1,000 soldiers in an armored formation called Task Force Razor
drove to within 820 meters of the blast site as a mushroom cloud formed overhead. Upon
reaching a threshold of 1 rad per hour inside the lead tanks, the task force turned and
maneuvered around ground zero to assault a nearby objective. Radiation monitors tracked
exposures, both outside and inside the vehicles, as well as to all participating personnel
[42].
While the Apple 2 test conclusively proved that the 1955 fleet of vehicles and
crews could operate in the vicinity of a nuclear attack, it was never repeated. Although it
is possible to extract some information about the radiation protection provided by the
vehicles from the test data, Task Force Razor was intended to demonstrate capabilities and
build confidence for tactical formations, not to specifically evaluate the M48 tanks and
M59 armored personnel carriers used.
Following the implementation of the Partial Test Ban Treaty, military vehicle
susceptibility to ionizing radiation had to be evaluated by analogous radiation sources.
Several test facilities were constructed during this time. For example, the AURORA X-ray
facility evaluated vehicle shielding in high-energy photon radiation fields. The United
States produced and operated several fast burst reactors made of bare, weapons-grade
uranium, that produced gamma and neutron spectra that were very similar to those of a
fission-only nuclear weapon. These reactors included Lady Godiva, Godiva II, the Army
Pulse Radiation Facility, and the Fast Burst Reactor. This allowed limited testing of
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components and vehicles to weapon-like radiation spectra and fluences [43]. The Army
Pulse Radiation Facility was specifically dedicated to radiation testing of vehicles and
vehicle components [44, 45].
2.2 Radiation Research: Fall of the Soviet Union to Present
Following the end of the Cold War, funding priorities shifted away from defense
spending in general and nuclear weapons effects research in particular. The United States
went into an indefinite weapons testing moratorium in October of 1992, cutting short
planned underground nuclear testing. The Army stopped evaluating the protection offered
by its combat vehicles and discontinued publishing AR 70-60: Army Nuclear Survivability.
It was replaced with AR 70-75: Survivability of Army Personnel and Material in 2005 [46],
which delegates the writing of standards for chemical, biological, and nuclear threats and
establishes procedures for ignoring those standards.
Current hold-over facilities from the Cold War tend to be less specialized in their
applications, and many overlapping capabilities have been eliminated. The only remaining
reactor in the United States capable of creating a spectrum of radiation from a bare, unmoderated reactor in a prompt, supercritical mode is the Fast Burst Reactor at White Sands
Missile Range, New Mexico. This reactor is of particular interest, as it can be operated
outdoors, providing measurable radiation environments similar, though far smaller in
magnitude, to those of a fission weapon [47].
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2.3 Non-Military Research
The subject of vehicular radiation shielding has been extended into other
applications. As NASA works toward the goal of manned interstellar missions, the threat
of radiation to astronauts in deep space is a major concern. Solar events can create both
heavy charged particle radiation and neutron radiation within a spacecraft through protonneutron nuclear reactions [48]. Additionally, cosmic radiation consisting of heavy charged
particles and gamma rays can contribute significantly to an astronaut’s dose during a deep
space mission [49]. The mass-limited nature of spacecraft design poses a challenge for
understanding and optimizing protection for direction-dependent incident radiation fluxes
[50]. Data presented in Figure 3 shows how astronauts on interplanetary missions can
expect to receive far greater cumulative doses than even the elevated doses they currently
receive on ISS missions.

Figure 3. Comparison of benchmark doses with doses of interest to manned space missions.
Recreated from NASA [51].

16

Civilian research into shielding has also been motivated by the need to protect
personnel and property during responses to radiological and nuclear accidents. Such
research tends to peak after significant accidents [52]. The Fukushima disaster has sparked
renewed interest in responding to nuclear emergencies and highly radioactive areas. Recent
difficulties in recovering damaged fuel that escaped the Fukushima reactor core highlights
the need for effective mobile shielding, even for robotic platforms, due to the vulnerability
of their electronics to doses over 100 Grays [53].
2.4 Radiation Shielding Theory
Gamma ray interactions with matter primarily consist of photoelectric absorption,
Compton scattering, and pair production [54]. For energies typically associated with
nuclear weapons between 100 keV and 4 MeV, Compton scattering is the dominant
interaction for most materials [55]. Since Compton interactions and photoelectric
absorptions take place between gamma rays and electrons, effective gamma ray shielding
tends to be made of heavier elements with a high density of electrons.
Neutrons interact with atomic nuclei primarily by scattering collisions and
absorption. Fast neutrons are not generally absorbed in most shielding materials until they
have thermalized (slowed down) through a series of collisions with nuclei. In contrast to
the materials used in gamma shielding, effective neutron shielding has two key
components. The dominant component is hydrogen atoms, which provides the ability for
protons to maximize collision energy transfer, and the other is a material which can readily
absorb thermalized neutrons. Absorption can be increased significantly by adding a
material with a particularly large neutron capture cross section to a thermalizing material.
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Three well-known thermal neutron absorbers are specific isotopes of boron, gadolinium,
or cadmium [56], all of which are commonly used in conventional nuclear power reactors’
control rods and emergency shutdown systems to reduce the neutron population and slow
or stop the fission chain reaction.
Computing Dose: Flux-to-Dose Conversion
As discussed in the previous section, high-energy photons associated with nuclear
weapon radiation tend to impart their energy to electrons [57]. These energy depositions
tend to be distributed over an energy and material-dependent range of depths. The
subsequently excited electrons tend to scatter and distribute energy through a wider volume
of material than a heavy charged particle [15]. Thus an interacting gamma ray flux tends
to create a low density of ionizations in a target material.
Elastic scattering neutrons tend to deposit considerable energy to a target nucleus,
which becomes a heavy charged particle [54]. Such interactions tend to cause a high density
of ionizations in a relatively small volume. In living tissue, this density of ionizations leads
to concentrated damage to DNA and proteins that is more difficult to properly repair than
the lower-density damage created by gamma rays. Therefore, high energy neutron fluxes
tend to increase long-term stochastic health risks more than their doses would ordinarily
indicate, an effect accounted for by applying energy-dependent weighting factors to
neutron flux spectra. The NRC and ICRP have slightly different standards of weighting
factors for computing the dose equivalent or equivalent dose for energy groups of neutrons
[15].
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From Cember’s Health Physics, a flux of photons in a given material can be
converted into an exposure and a dose rate, and this flux-to-exposure-to-dose rate
conversion is valid for photon energies up to 4 MeV [15]. The dose rate is given in Grays
per second as

𝐷𝐷̇𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔 =

𝜙𝜙�

𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
𝐽𝐽
1
�∙𝐸𝐸�
�∙�1.6∙10−13 ∙
�∙𝜇𝜇𝑚𝑚 ∙� �
𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐2 ∙𝑠𝑠
𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 𝐽𝐽⁄𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘
𝜌𝜌𝑚𝑚 ∙� 3 �∙
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐

,

(1)

where 𝜙𝜙 is the flux of monoenergetic photons per square centimeter per second, 𝐸𝐸 is the
energy of each photon, 𝜇𝜇𝑚𝑚 is the linear energy absorption coefficient for the target medium,

and 𝜌𝜌𝑚𝑚 is the density of the target medium. By summing this expression over m energy bins
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By log-log interpolation of tabled linear energy absorption coefficients for soft tissue, a
cumulative dose can thus be calculated from a known gamma ray flux
A variety of neutron flux-to-dose equivalent tables have been published [58, 59, 60,
61, 62, 63]. The conversion coefficients in these tables are normalized to the unit of
radiation fluence and provided in units of Sv-cm^2 or rem-cm^2. The product of these
conversion coefficients and the incident radiation fluence then gives the dose equivalent,
in Sv or rem. The result is meant to indicate the increased risk of long-term stochastic
health risks, not short term deterministic effects. Such tables require mathematical
manipulation to remove weighting factors for neutron energies. By dividing the dose
19

equivalents in sieverts by the energy-dependent weighting factors, such tables can be
modified to provide the dose in gray. Using a log-log interpolation of the adjusted dose
equivalent chart to find the dose for m energy bins, we can calculate a neutron dose rate as
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where 𝜙𝜙𝑖𝑖 is the neutron flux for the ith energy bin and 𝐷𝐷𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 is the dose rate associated with
one neutron per second of the ith energy bin.

Gamma and neutron energy spectra for various unclassified nuclear weapon
sources are tabulated by DTRA [64]. While these spectra can no longer be directly
measured due to the moratorium on nuclear weapons testing that has been in place since
1991, they provide useful benchmarks which can be compared to the experimentally
verifiable simulations of this work. This is the basis with which it is possible to model
gamma ray and neutron shielding provided by a vehicle.
Importance of 3-Dimensional Geometry and Scattering
Scintillation detectors have been widely used to detect ionizing radiation. In most
applications, their principles of operation are similar. Ionizing radiation deposits its energy
within the scintillating crystal, exciting electrons in the atoms of the crystal lattice. These
atoms’ electrons de-excite or “fluoresce,” releasing a number of photons proportional to
the energy deposited. The crystal itself is transparent to its own fluorescent photons,
allowing them to be collected on a photocathode which releases a number of electrons
ideally proportional to the number of fluoresced photons. By accelerating the electrons
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released by the photocathode in a series of electric fields into metal plates, these electrons
are multiplied and collected at an anode, producing a signal that can be subsequently
amplified and processed into discrete pulses. This photon-to-signal process is contained in
a device known as a photomultiplier tube. In the case of gamma radiation, the height of the
produced pulse corresponds to the energy of the interaction within the detector, which is
driven by the energy of the incident gamma ray and the materials of the scintillator [54].
In the case of a scintillator used to detect thermal neutrons, a neutron is captured
within the scintillator and causes a nuclear reaction. In most cases, the heavy charged
particles resulting from that nuclear reaction are captured within the scintillator, depositing
their kinetic energy within the fluorescent material. From that point, the process is the same
as in a gamma scintillator, but the nature of the neutron capture means that the spectrum
produced consists of discrete peaks defined by the nuclear interactions and the properties
of the detector material itself, not the energy of the neutron.
Thus thermal neutron detectors do not give spectral information about the neutron
flux, because they only detect thermal neutrons. Rather, they provide a count rate of
particular neutron interactions within the detector. One method of attaining a neutron
energy spectrum using such a detector is to take multiple observations of neutron count
rates of a LiI scintillator placed within polyethylene spheres, known as “Bonner spheres,”
of varying radii. The hydrogenous polyethylene spheres act to moderate (decrease neutron
speeds of) the neutron flux to varying degrees, and the scintillator then detects those
neutrons that are thermalized. By building a library of expected response functions for the
detector within each sphere, it is possible to mathematically unfold a neutron spectrum.
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Another method of neutron spectroscopy commonly used in high-flux experiments
is foil activation spectroscopy. In this approach, an array of materials is exposed to a
neutron flux. After the irradiation, each material is separately evaluated to determine the
amount of neutron-activation. Using known energy cross section data to define the
appropriate expected response of each material, it is then possible to unfold a neutron
energy spectrum. This technique has the advantage of only requiring a single irradiation to
produce a spectrum. However, it requires higher fluxes than the Bonner sphere
spectroscopy method to obtain statistically significant results [65].
Vehicle/Equipment vs. Personnel Vulnerability
While this research focuses on radiation threats to personnel, some systems on
modern armored vehicles are susceptible to degradation and loss of function when
subjected to high fluences of radiation. While vehicles in the 1950s were subjected to
radiation from atmospheric nuclear weapons tests, as previously described, there were no
operational effects at the dose levels they received. This does not necessarily mean that
modern vehicles would be as intrinsically resilient. Electronic systems, which play more
important roles in modern vehicles than their 1950s counterparts, are particularly
susceptible, and modern electronics are more susceptible than those of previous
generations. However, the doses to electronics that are required to produce any detectable
effect in modern or antiquated electronics are one to two orders of magnitude greater than
doses associated with a 100% chance of death from short-term, deterministic radiation
health effects [53, 66]. Therefore, vehicle crews are the weak point for any vehicle unless
that vehicle can reduce radiation doses to occupants by a factor of a hundred or more.
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Equipment vulnerability is a related concern that has received relatively little
attention. Even before the end of the Cold War, the United States Army fielded most of its
equipment without considering its survivability in a nuclear weapon environment. Nuclear
survivability was only included in the equipment procurement process beginning in 1977,
with the philosophy that a soldier’s essential equipment should survive nuclear attack at
least as well as the soldier. This approach is justified; with the notable exception of EMP,
most prompt nuclear weapons effects that would degrade or destroy a soldier’s equipment
would easily kill the soldier [67].

2.5 Modeling Radiation Shielding
A rough first-order approximation of one-dimensional radiation shielding for
photons can be calculated using a simple attenuation formula,
𝝋𝝋𝒐𝒐𝒖𝒖𝒖𝒖 = 𝝋𝝋𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 𝒆𝒆−𝝁𝝁𝝁𝝁𝝁𝝁 ,

(4)

where 𝜑𝜑𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 is the flux leaving a barrier, 𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the flux entering the barrier, μ is the mass
attenuation coefficient specific to the energy of the photon flux, ρ is the density of the
barrier material, and t is the thickness of the barrier. Attenuation coefficients for both
photon fluxes and photon energy fluxes are available from NIST [68]. Although it is
possible to select a single representative energy and compute an approximate reduction in
flux energy using that energy group’s attenuation coefficient, such a technique must be
calibrated to a chosen shielding scenario. Such a calibration will lose accuracy as the
energy spectrum changes with distance from a radiation source due to interactions in air
and ground and secondary radiation from neutrons. This simple model will also lose
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accuracy for barriers that cannot be approximated as simple slabs because of angular
scattering. Finally, this simple one-dimensional model only accounts for simple onedimensional fluxes, not for an angular distribution of incoming radiation. The advantages
of this approach are its computational efficiency and simplicity, as the simple attenuation
model can provide a good approximation of many shielding scenarios in a single
mathematical operation.
Semi-Empirical Formulas
An improved method for determining reductions in incoming radiation due to a
shielding structure is described in Charles Eisenhauer’s “An Engineering Method for
Calculating Protection Afforded by Structures Against Fallout Radiation [69],” which
accounted for some photon scattering in slab geometries via buildup factors. This approach
replaces the exponential attenuation model with charts and tables derived from simulations
and nuclear testing. Additionally, the geometry of angular intensity distributions for
incoming radiation allows for a better approximation of incoming shielding. However,
once the thickness of a shield from an angular flux component is calculated, the engineering
method continues to treat all shielding structures as one-dimensional barriers. Thus, the
engineering method does not account for angular scattering within a structure, secondorder radiation brought on by neutron interactions, or different energy spectra. The
reduction factors produced are only somewhat improved from first-order approximations
[69].
Discrete ordinates offer an alternate shield-modeling approach. By discretizing a
shielding volume into a series of zones and approximating the probabilities of different
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types of interactions and their outcomes into discrete angular and energy flux groups, this
method is capable of modeling some of the geometric and physics interactions with
relatively good computational efficiency. There are two key drawbacks to using discrete
ordinates. First, they are not intrinsically accurate, but must be set up and adjusted to
become so. Discretations of space and energy must be selected that approximate a reality
of distributed locations and energies within a radiation shielding scenario. Without some
experimental verification on the fluxes of a discrete ordinates simulation, it is difficult to
ascertain the accuracy of this method; output data from discrete ordinates simulations tend
to be deceptively smooth, suggesting a much smaller margin of error than should exist. The
second drawback of discrete ordinates simulations is a lack of portability. A discrete
ordinates simulation in one scenario may require significant adjustments to its chosen
energy, angle, and location groups for different geometries, materials, types of radiation,
and input energies. A variety of discrete ordinates techniques and approaches have been
applied to radiation shielding simulations for the last half century [70, 71, 72, 73].
Monte Carlo radiation transport applications considering human dosimetry have
been the subject of development since the 1950s [74]. These methods provide the most
reliable and accurate simulation technique for measuring radiation transport in shielding
applications. By randomly sampling a particle’s direction, distance to interaction, type of
interaction, and the outcome of each interaction (among other parameters), one particle at
a time, and iterating this process many times in a computer, a Monte Carlo approach closely
matches the probabilistic features of radiation transport as observed in nature.
Tallying is the method by which Monte Carlo simulations produce useful
information. A tally in a Monte Carlo simulation establishes conditions under which a
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tracked particle will be counted, as well as the method by which it is counted. For example,
a tally could count all particles crossing into a simulated detector surface and sort that tally
into energy bins, creating an energy flux spectrum. Alternately, a tally could count the
number of interactions within a simulated detector and sort these interactions by their
energies, creating an energy deposition spectrum. Whatever the definition of the tally, the
useful information comes from the statistical data collected. By counting large numbers of
particles crossing into or interacting within regions of interest inside a three-dimensional
model, it is possible to collect statistical data on radiation transport that closely models
reality.
The accuracy of these models depend on the fidelity of the three-dimensional model
to its real-world counterpart, the fidelity of the radiation source spectrum to its real-world
counterpart, the accuracy of the simulation’s interaction cross section library, and the
accuracy of the simulation’s interaction sampling algorithms. The precision of such
models depends on two factors. The first factor is the computational efficiency of the
simulation, which is a comparison of the number of particles tallied versus the number of
original particles generated. The second factor is the raw number of original particles
created [31].
Since the computational efficiency of most Monte Carlo shielding simulations
tends to be intrinsically low, the Monte Carlo approach generally requires many sampling
operations in order to yield statistically useful data. This was a significant problem during
the Cold War, when computers were orders of magnitude less powerful than today, limiting
simulations to small sizes. Modern computers are capable of yielding statistically
significant data for less computationally efficient simulations in far less time [35]. Further
26

improvements in computational efficiency have been developed using techniques
collectively known as variance reduction methods.
One method for improving the computational efficiency of Monte Carlo methods
is to use it in conjunction with discrete ordinates methods. An example of this is the Vehicle
Code System (VCS) program developed at Oak Ridge National Laboratory in the early
1970s and updated until 2001. It is still available from the National Nuclear Security
Administration, though its updates were apparently developed for compatibility purposes
only, as the user’s manual has not been updated since 1974 [75, 76]. VCS was intended to
solve the same problem as this research. VCS coupled radiation transport in air using
discrete ordinates methods with a Monte Carlo approach in the shielding itself. Its
developer claimed it could calculate the dose from a low-yield nuclear explosion within 1
km of a tactical vehicle at a variety of angles. According to documentation, the program
took two and a half hours to run from beginning to end, with additional 25-minute
evaluations of different angles, if desired, on an IBM 195 computer, which was the most
powerful IBM model as of 1970. Given that modern computers are orders of magnitude
more powerful; this code could likely run on a modern computer in a few minutes or less.
The vehicle models were simple geometric shapes and the cross section library and
discretized input spectra were imprecise by modern standards, but the Monte Carlo code
for transporting the radiation was a true three-dimensional simulation which produced
partially validated spectra for neutron and gamma radiation. Though crude by modern
standards, the fundamental process of VCS allowed for gamma and neutron spectra, doses,
and radiation protection factors to be simulated within a vehicle. Unfortunately, the full
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process was never experimentally validated, and the code was not widely tested or
implemented.
2.6 Improving the Computational Efficiency of Monte Carlo Simulations
Variance reduction methods are scenario-specific adjustments to a Monte Carlo
simulation designed to reduce the number of randomly sampled particles that do not yield
tallied data. The first method of variance reduction that is generally applied is known as
geometry reduction. By eliminating regions of interactions that contribute negligible
amounts of data to the output tallies, the computational efficiency is improved.
Another method of variance reduction is to reduce the relative importance of
regions in which few interactions contribute to the output tally. For example, the wall of a
room around a shielding experiment might be reduced to a hundredth of the rest of the
simulation’s importance. When a particle enters the wall, the simulation randomly
determines whether it should continue to be tracked, or whether it should be “killed.” In
this case, the particle has a 99% chance of being killed. If it is not killed, the importance of
this particle increases a hundredfold. This operation is known as “Russian Roulette.”
Should the particle then scatter and return to the inside of the room, it may be split into
100 identical particles, which is known as “particle splitting,” or simply continue as a
particle with 100 times the normal importance should it meet the simulation’s tally criteria.
Typically, an optimized Monte Carlo simulation will have a defined weighting window
and apply Russian roulette and particle splitting to keep particle weights within a range of
acceptable values.
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Another approach to variance reduction is known as multi-step modeling. In this
approach, a Monte Carlo simulation transports radiation to a surface of interest, tallying
the particles that cross that surface. A subsequent simulation uses the flux spectrum
crossing that surface as a source term. This method is of particular interest for radiation
shielding and protection studies, since it allows an initial simulation to transport radiation
from a source to a small region around the shielding, and then a series of subsequent
simulations to evaluate different shielding scenarios.
Finally, it is possible to improve the computational efficiency of a Monte Carlo
simulation by taking advantage of symmetries within the simulation similar to the
assumptions driving the VCS program described earlier. For example, if a source is
emitting radiation isotropically, and the wider environment does not vary considerably,
then a radiation flux at one point from the source can be expected to be very similar at
every equidistant point from the radiation source and other nearby surfaces such as the
ground. This radial symmetry, when combined with multi-step modeling, can improve the
computational efficiency of the overall approach by one to four orders of magnitude. Such
an application is detailed in Chapter 3.
2.7 Validation Assessment Techniques
Unfolding the neutron spectrum from count rate measurements is done with the
Maximum Entropy Deconvolution (MAXED) program. Using the measured count rates
for each Bonner sphere measurement, an a priori spectrum from the MCNP6 simulation,
and known Bonner sphere response functions, MAXED calculates an optimal neutron flux
solution spectrum, 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 , which maximizes the entropy, S, as in
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Where 𝒇𝒇𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫 is the a priori spectrum. This produces a solution spectrum that matches the a

priori spectrum while agreeing with the experimental count rates for each Bonner sphere
measurement. MAXED also provides a validation metric in the form of a chi squared test
by solving the resulting Lagrangian to produce a
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value. This value indicates a

statistically significant result when it is less than one [77].
Assessing MCNP6’s gamma radiation shielding accuracy is done by directly
comparing ratios of dose information integrated from an MCNP6 pulse height tally and
experimentally measured spectra.

An F8 pulse height tally in MCNP counts the

interactions within a simulated detector crystal and sorts these counts into predetermined
energy bins [78]. The activity in each bin is multiplied by the energy associated with that
bin, and the products are summed to produce a number representing the total dose. For a
simulation using m bins, the resulting simulated gamma protection factor can be calculated
as
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where 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢 represents the total energy deposited in the unshielded state, 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑠𝑠ℎ

represents the total energy deposited in the shielded state, E represents of the energy of the
ith bin, and A represents the unshielded or shielded activity of each bin. Similarly, the
experimental spectra can be numerically integrated, and the resulting unshielded energy
absorbed is divided by the shielded energy absorbed.
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Since dose is defined as energy absorbed divided by the mass of the absorbing body, the
mass terms in both the shielded and unshielded scenarios cancel out when determining a
GPF, the standard deviation for a GPF need not include the mass or dose of the absorbing
body; the energy absorbed is sufficient.

Since experimental spectra have three or

more orders of magnitude higher count rates in their bins than their counterpart simulations,
the statistical uncertainty of the experimental doses is negligible by the Law of Large
Numbers. The MCNP6 simulation F8 pulse height tallies require post processing to
evaluate. The activity in each bin is assumed to have a standard distribution by the Central
Limit Theorem. MCNP6’s F8 tallies include a quantity known as relative error, which is
the standard deviation divided by the mean energy value of that bin. This means that lowactivity bins tend to have high relative errors. The statistical error for these bins can be
combined into a standard deviation for an energy measurement by Equation 7.
𝟐𝟐
𝝈𝝈𝒆𝒆𝒆𝒆𝒆𝒆𝒆𝒆𝒆𝒆𝒆𝒆 = �∑𝒎𝒎
𝒊𝒊=𝟏𝟏(𝑬𝑬𝒊𝒊 ∗ 𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝒊𝒊 )

(7)

In Equation 7, 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 is the relative error for the ith bin. The resulting GPF standard deviation
can be determined by Equation 8,

𝝈𝝈𝒖𝒖𝒖𝒖𝒖𝒖𝒖𝒖𝒖𝒖𝒖𝒖𝒖𝒖𝒖𝒖 𝟐𝟐

𝝈𝝈

𝟐𝟐

𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔
𝝈𝝈𝑮𝑮𝑮𝑮𝑮𝑮 = ��𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬 � + �𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬
� ,
𝒖𝒖𝒖𝒖

𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔

(8)

Using this GPF standard deviation, a 95% confidence interval can be generated by taking
the computed GPF and applying ±2𝜎𝜎𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 . Comparing this 95% confidence interval to the

experimental GPF provides a useful metric for the validity of the gamma radiation
transport.
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III. Methodology

3.1 The RPF Method
At its simplest, an RPF can be produced by simulations of a source environment
with and without the presence of shielding. However, simulations alone are suspect; they
may omit or improperly model factors affecting radiation transport. Therefore, most RPF
evaluations used in this research involve three steps: a radiation shielding scenario
experimentally measured with and without a shield, a MCNP6 model of the experimental
measurements, and calculations of doses and the RPF. Due to the fact that neutron and
gamma detectors used in this research have disparate geometries, an experimentally
validated RPF requires an additional step of merging simulation geometries as shown in
Figure 4.

Figure 4. One method for producing experimentally-validated RPFs. In this case,
experimental spectra validate particle transport, and then the modeled detector geometries
are altered to match.
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In this method, the models of gamma and neutron simulations are validated and
then adjusted such that they share target geometry; a final pair of simulations then tally the
gamma and neutron flux into this shared target in unshielded and shielded scenarios, doses
are tallied, and the RPF is computed.
These steps varied depending on the scenario and radiation transport modeled. For
short-distance irradiations with two feet or less between source and detector, radiation was
transported from the source through the scenario’s geometry to the detector in a single step.
Modeling such scenarios required four simulations, consisting of gamma and neutron
simulations with and without a shield. For irradiations with 12 feet or more between the
source and detector, geometrically greater computing requirements required multi-step
modeling approaches. One such approach is shown in Figure 5. More specifics about the
multi-step approaches used in this research appear later in this chapter.
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Figure 5. Steps for producing shielded and unshielded gamma radiation doses of a Fast Burst
Reactor shielding scenario using a multi-step approach.

Different RPF calculation methodologies are explored, explained, and compared in
further detail in Chapter 6.
3.2 Approach to Model Validation
This dissertation presents an iterative approach to developing the RPF
methodology. Each subsequent chapter details a step meant to build confidence in the
validation of MCNP6 as a platform for evaluating RPFs. The research that went into the
experimental validation chapters was intended to evaluate the software and experimental
equipment in scenarios of incrementally increasing difficulty and complexity. Each
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chapter’s research is meant to be mutually supporting without depending on a specific
result to move from one chapter’s content to the next.
The neutron detector used for experimental validation is the Ludlum 4 mm x 4 mm
LiI scintillator [79]. The LiI detector is a thermal neutron detector and has almost no
capture cross section for fast neutrons. Therefore, in order to get a neutron energy spectrum,
this detector is used in conjunction with a set of Bonner balls consisting of high-density
polyethylene spheres of varying diameter, which serve to thermalize a neutron flux to
varying degrees. A full set of Bonner Balls is depicted with a LiI scintillator in Figure 6.
By taking time-normalized count rates with the same detector in the same location with the
same irradiating source, but with a different moderating thickness around the detector, it is
possible to unfold a neutron spectrum using MAXED that is suitable for dose calculations
[34, 80].

Figure 6. Complete Bonner sphere set with LiI scintillator. The active portion of the detector
is inserted into the top pictured ball.

35

The gamma detector used in this research is the Saint Gobain BrilLanCe 380 ¾ in
x 2 in LaBr scintillator [81]. This LaBr scintillator directly measures a gamma spectrum in
a single measurement. The scintillating crystal of the LaBr detector is of similar shape and
size to that of the LiI detector.
3.3 Experimental Validation with the PuBe Source
The first experimental validation study presented in Chapter 4 used a PuBe source
for both neutron and gamma radiation. Its inactive training surrogate is pictured in Figure
7.

Figure 7. PuBe training surrogate with an identical size and shape, and a similar weight, to
the active PuBe source.

This source represented a step up in complexity over monoenergetic radioisotope
sources used in previous and parallel research described in Chapter 1. Unlike most single
radioisotope sources, PuBe sources emit a probabilistic distribution of high-energy
photons, as well as a probabilistic distribution of neutrons. This source irradiated
detectors placed with and without a complex materials surrogate shielding enclosure
pictured in Figure 8.
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Figure 8. The complex materials surrogate assembled.

The shielding enclosure used in the PuBe evaluation was a 2ft x 2ft x 2ft box
consisting of an 80/20 aluminum box frame with 22 inch sides covered by three layers of
plates: a ½ inch steel layer, a ½ inch polyethylene layer, and a ¼ inch aluminum layer. This
was meant to model different materials commonly used in military vehicle armor. The
addition of the hydrogenous polyethylene layer added additional neutron moderation to the
shielding.
3.4 Measuring the Gamma Emissions of the Fast Burst Reactor
The next validation experiment was meant to demonstrate MCNP’s ability to model
RPFs with energy spectra similar to those of a fission-only nuclear burst. While the Fast
Burst Reactor (FBR) could provide such spectra, this presented a problem for experimental
RPF assessments, because the gamma spectrum of the active FBR had never been directly
measured before. The high fluxes of gamma radiation in the reactor chamber during
operation had saturated all direct spectra measurements in previous attempts. Even after
overcoming this challenge, the reactor’s dynamic geometry between its active and
shutdown state introduced spectral anomalies that prevented separating the residual decay
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radiation of the reactor from its active output due to ongoing fission during operation.
Chapter 5 details a novel approach that overcame these challenges by running the reactor
at very low power, using attenuating sheaths around the gamma detector, and altering the
reactor’s shutdown procedure.
3.5 GPF Validation
The usable gamma spectroscopy techniques pioneered in Chapter 5 enabled a
follow-on effort to validate MCNP6’s ability to model gamma shielding benefits against
the FBR’s gamma emissions using a previously un-validated source term provided by the
FBR team at White Sands Missile Range. This effort yielded negative results, and
validation was not achieved after three attempts to adjust the models to better fit the data.
Chapter 6 describes the efforts to recreate FBR gamma measurements and GPFs in
MCNP6.
GPF validations used a similar enclosure to that of Chapter 4, replacing the
aluminum and polyethylene composite plates with steel plates, as shown in Figure 9. This
surrogate had already provided the preliminary scenarios for gamma and neutron transport
validation at AFIT using a PuBe source, a Deuterium-Deuterium (D-D)

neutron

generator, and the FBR by Andrew Decker [34]. It was also evaluated for gamma transport
in separate experiments using a 137Cs source, a 60Co source, and the FBR [35].
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Figure 9. Steel plates used in the GPF outer shield, and a model of the assembled steel outer
shield.

A third surrogate actually consisted of two surrogates. The first was a smaller version
of the cubic simple steel surrogate built on a smaller 16-inch frame shown in Figure 10.
This smaller steel enclosure was placed inside the larger steel enclosure. This configuration
was intended to simulate a more complex geometry analogous to multiple compartments
or layers in the same vehicle.

Figure 10. Inner enclosure used in the GPF evaluations.
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3.6 RPF Techniques
Chapter 6 also describes and compares methods and strategies for modeling and
calculating RPFs. Rather than experimentally validating the models, this section only uses
MCNP6 models, examining the effects and utility of different tally techniques,
target/detector geometries, dose calculation methods, and dose units upon RPFs. Practical
factors considered include modeling efficiency, interest in stochastic vs. deterministic
effects, variations in RPFs produced, and which approaches best fit the “most
conservative” principle applied in radiation safety regulations.
3.7 Stryker Modeling
Finally, Chapter 6 describes a series of simulations modeling a Stryker vehicle
subjected to the radiation field from a nuclear weapon. These models were assembled in
SWORD and run in MCNP6. This effort was intended to evaluate a high-fidelity model of
the vehicle and compare it to a steel right parallel-piped of similar dimensions and hull
thickness to the Stryker. Comparing the RPFs produced at various angles to the modeled
vehicle was intended to demonstrated the role of vehicle orientation with respect to a
radiation source. Comparing the results of the high and low fidelity models would illustrate
the importance of model fidelity and suggest what level of detail was required to achieve
useful results. This modeling effort was ultimately unsuccessful for reasons discussed in
Chapter 6.
3.8 Modeling Methodologies
For simulating PuBe irradiations of the steel and three-material surrogates, it is not
necessary to do much variance reduction, as the distances involved are short enough that
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the tally efficiency of the simulation is acceptable. Nor is it strictly necessary to use
SWORD to produce the simulation, as the geometries involved are simple.
FBR simulations are far less computationally efficient to model due to the larger 812 ft distances between source and target and the geometrically greater volumes involved.
While traditional weight window techniques of Russian roulette and particle splitting can
result in some improvement, a more effective approach is multi-step modeling. In this
approach, MCNP6 can use one simulation to transport radiation from the source to a region
in the vicinity of the target and record the individually modeled particles as they cross into
the region around the target. A subsequent simulation can model transport in and around
the target itself. For the purposes of RPF simulations, a single simulation can model the
radiation transport up to just outside a shielding enclosure, and subsequent simulations can
model the radiation transport with and without shielding, with or without Bonner spheres
of different radii, and with different types of detectors and tallies. Using this multi-step
modeling approach, and keeping the second-step simulation volumes as small as possible,
reduced the total simulation time for each RPF evaluation of the FBR by 72%.
In practice, this approach can be performed using the surface source write (SSW)
and surface source read (SSR) cards in MCNP6, and this approach was used in some early
GPF assessments of the FBR. Alternately, surface tallies from one simulation can define
the source term for a second simulation or series of simulations; this was used in the
majority of GPF assessments of the FBR and all of the later nuclear attack simulations
using the Annulus Approximation described in the next section. The advantage of SSR and
SSW cards is that they preserve the vectors of incident particles. The advantage of using
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surface tallies is that they require smaller amounts of RAM and do not require the tallied
geometry of the first simulation to match the source geometry of the second simulation.
Simulations of a nuclear explosion scale the problem up even further, since the
distance at which an armored vehicle might endure a nuclear explosion far exceeds the
inches to feet of the experiments in this research. This was important for initial assessments
of the FBR, as well as Chapter 6’s treatment of a nuclear weapon as a source term.
Transporting radiation from that source over a kilometer or more required a method that
could reduce computation time by more than two orders of magnitude.
The Annulus Approximation
Given an isotropic source in a large, open area, the flux across the surface of any
detector equidistant from that source should be identical. Therefore, rather than tallying the
interactions or fluxes going into LiI detectors twelve feet away from a simulated FBR, it is
three orders of magnitude more efficient to revolve the volumes of those detectors about
the simulated FBR, forming an annulus, and tally the flux into that annulus in a “step 1”
simulation. Then, using the energy spectrum of that flux as a source term, a “step 2”
simulation consisting of only the detector can produce simulated interaction data within
the detector, as shown in Figure 11.
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Figure 11. A representation of the annulus approximation applied to a simple two-step
MCNP6 simulation.

The step 2 simulation can be expanded to model a shielding scenario as well. This
approach, however, presents a problem for modeling shielding scenarios, as it loses
directionally-dependent spectral information around the shielding geometry and detector
in the step 2 simulations. Direction-dependent spectra are important, as many vehicles
present more shielding at certain angles of incident radiation flux than to others. When
neutrons and high-energy photons scatter off the ground and up towards a target, their
energy is reduced, which changes the shape of the spectrum coming from that direction. In
the parlance of nuclear weapons testing, this is referred to as ground-shine. Similarly,
particles that scatter off the air and down toward a target are collectively referred to as skyshine [75]. Both of these terms have become widely used in other radiation transport
problems. For the purposes of this research, the term “direct-shine” is an appropriate
addition to these terms. All three terms are shown schematically in Figure 12.
In order to account for these direction-dependent spectra at the FBR, the annulus
simulation is modified, adding a second “killer” annulus inside the tally annulus. This killer
annulus kills all particles that enter it, effectively eliminating direct-shine. Both the FBR
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and the detector are placed approximately equidistant from the floor and the ceiling, and
both the floor and ceiling of the FBR chamber are made of concrete. Therefore, for indoor
FBR irradiations, no further direction-killing annuli are necessary, because the spectrum
scattering off the ceiling of the reactor chamber is essentially identical to that scattering off
the floor. For an outdoor FBR irradiation, a second killer annulus would also be necessary
in order to isolate all three direction-dependent spectra. Depending on the degree to which
spectral shape changes with incidence angle, more solid angles could be defined by adding
and replacing additional killer annuli, but for the purposes of this research, two or three
zones is an adequate approximation.

Figure 12. A representation of the method used to collect two direction-dependent flux
spectra incident upon a detector-representing annulus.

These direction-dependent spectra must then be generated in a subsequent step 2
simulation that includes the radiation shield and the detector. The direct-shine spectrum is
emitted by a flat surface source, while ground-shine and sky-shine are emitted by solid
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angles of a cylindrical surface source with its central axis passing through the detector, as
shown in Figure 13.

Figure 13. Representation of applying the direct-shine and ground-shine spectra to the
shielding enclosure and detector in the second step of a directionally-dependent annulus
approximating two-step MCNP6 simulation.
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IV. Development of Radiation Protection Factors with Gamma and
Neutron Spectroscopy Using a Plutonium-Beryllium Source

This chapter was published as a paper in the Journal of Radiation Effects in April
2018: W.J. Erwin, E. Cazalas, J.W. McClory, A.W. Decker, “Development of Radiation
Protection Factors with Gamma and Neutron Spectroscopy Using a Plutonium-Beryllium
Source,” Journal of Radiation Effects, Research and Engineering, vol. 36, no. 1, pp. 8893, April 2018.
4.1 Abstract
Verification and validation of computational codes for radiation protection requires
detailed understanding of model generation and results, and how these compare to the
experimental design and measured data. This work explores the degree of protection
offered by a shield against a source that contains both neutron and gamma radiation, known
as a radiation protection factor. Neutron spectra are calculated using a flux spectrum
unfolded from Bonner sphere spectroscopy, whereas the photon dose rate is calculated
through gamma spectroscopy. This work focuses on photon dose contribution through
comparison of the MCNP computed vs. the experimentally measured gamma protection
factor values using the gamma spectrum emitted by a plutonium-beryllium source. Results
show that the computational and experimental gamma protection factor values match
within 3%, which is significant, and the primary sources of deviation are understood and
described. Finally, a combined radiation protection factor from constituent gamma and
neutron dose rates is calculated.
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4.2 Introduction
During the Cold War, robust experimental testing quantified the degree of
protection provided by military ground vehicles against the hazards of ionizing radiation
to their crews and passengers. One of the most important products of these investigations
was the establishment of the radiation protection factor (RPF), a number which allowed
planners to accurately assess the nuclear survivability of mounted ground forces in a variety
of scenarios [82]. Additionally, RPF evaluations informed vehicle crews how best to orient
and configure their vehicles against radiation hazards prior to and during radiation
exposure.
Although testing procedures and facilities for evaluating RPF data have atrophied
since the Cold War, the improved computational capabilities available today allow these
investigations to be conducted using the Monte Carlo N-Particle version 6 (MCNP6)
physics simulator [83]. To validate the ability of MCNP6 to produce reliable RPF values,
prior work was conducted to evaluate MCNP6 code, producing gamma protection factor
(GPF) values [35, 34, 82, 84] and neutron protection factor (NPF) values [85, 86]. The
focus of this research is to demonstrate the validity of using computational simulations to
estimate experimental RPF values by 1) providing additional measurements of GPF and
NPF values in mixed neutron/gamma radiation fields using a PuBe (plutonium-beryllium)
source; 2) exploring the ability of MCNP code simulations to match experimental spectra
despite the issues of pulse pileup; and 3) calculating the quantitative combination of NPF
and GPF values into a combined RPF.
This method of matching experimental and simulated RPF values relies on the
ability of MCNP6 to predict the interaction physics of radiation with shielding and with
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objects enclosed in the shielding, in this case a detector. Accurate simulation requires
detailed modeling of the experimental geometry, knowledge of the source emission, and
normalization of tally results to the source strength.
Dosimetric information can be obtained from the simulation by flux-to-dose
conversion, as performed for neutron dose, or by summing energy deposited into the
detection region, as done herein, for gamma dose. The demonstration of matching
experimental and simulated GPF values using a PuBe source further exhibits the capability
to perform such matching in mixed gamma/neutron fields..
4.3 Background
An RPF is a unit-less ratio of the dose (D) or dose rate (Ḋ ) in a free-field (FF)

measurement to a measurement taken within a shielding enclosure (SH) in an otherwise
identical radiation field. RPF values can be calculated from the dose rate as in Equation 9
[5].
𝑫𝑫̇

𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹 = 𝑫𝑫̇𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭

𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺

(9)

The RPF can be broken into constituent gamma and neutron dose rates as in Equation 10.
𝑫𝑫̇𝜸𝜸,𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭 +𝑫𝑫̇𝒏𝒏,𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭 +𝑫𝑫̇(𝒏𝒏,𝜸𝜸),𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭
𝜸𝜸,𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺 +𝑫𝑫̇𝒏𝒏,𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺 +𝑫𝑫̇(𝒏𝒏,𝜸𝜸),𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺

𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹 = 𝑫𝑫̇

(10)

Included in the RPF of Equation 10 is the dose contribution from neutron activation
via (n,γ) decays. The (n,γ) dose contribution is not considered in this paper but will be
explored in future work. It is expected that (n,γ) contribution to RPF value is small while
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in an active radiation field. The NPF and GPF values are formed by the dose ratios in
Equation 9 but for only neutrons or gammas, respectively.
The neutron-based experiments to measure NPF values consist of a series of
measurements taken in a PuBe radiation field with a LiI (lithium iodide) detector using
moderating Bonner spheres of various radii in both shielded and free-field arrangements.
The measured neutron spectra can then be unfolded using Bonner sphere spectroscopy
(BSS) utilizing the MAXED (Maximum Entropy Deconvolution) code [84]. The gammabased experiments to measure GPF values consist of two sets of measurements with a LaBr
(lanthanum bromide) detector in shielded and free-field setups.

Figure 14. The geometry of the MCNP model in air including the composition and thicknesses
of shielding material, inner detector, and PuBe source. The geometry is to-scale for the
experimental shielding setup excluding walls, ceiling, and floor. Geometry and material
makeup of the PuBe source is included from specification sheets provided by the
manufacturer (Monsanto Research Corporation).
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The experimental shielded setup reproduced in MCNP6 is shown in Figure 14 for
a gamma field measurement. For the free-field setup, shielding material makeup and
density is set as surrounding air in the simulation.
In order to validate the ability of MCNP6 to produce reliable GPF estimates, an F8
pulse-height tally records the energy deposited by photon interactions within the simulated
detector. Binned by energy, the simulated spectra are compared to experimental
measurements. Since the detector’s mass does not change and divides out in the GPF
calculation, an actual calculation of dose is unnecessary and a representational Dose can
be calculated by multiplying bin count by bin energy for both simulation and experiment.
An F4 energy flux tally of photons into the simulated LiI detector can also be used to
calculate dose if (μ/ρ)en ratios (LaBr to tissue) are applied. However, given the primary
goal of validating MCNP6 code’s ability to replicate the experiment, the F8 tally was,
instead, utilized for dose and GPF comparison. For NPF value determination, a flux-todose conversion was used for the simulated results. Flux-to-dose conversion was necessary
in the case of NPF determination due to the complicated nature of spectral deconvolution
and recognizes neutron flux as a more analogous measure in a comparison between
experiment and simulation.
4.4 Gamma Protection Factor Results
A 5 Ci PuBe source (provided and calibrated by Monsanto Research Corporation)
produced the mixed neutron/gamma field with LiI and LaBr detectors for neutron and
gamma measurements, respectively. Detectors were placed ~31 cm from the PuBe source.
For a free-field measurement setup, detectors are placed in open air, approximately 1.2 m
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above the ground. In a shielded setup, the detectors were then placed within a 62.2 cm3
enclosure as in Figure 14.
The results of experiment and simulation are shown in Figure 15 and show a close
match between the two up to 4.5 MeV. Although gamma rays above these energies may be
produced by fissions within the PuBe source, these constitute a small minority of fission
emissions, and fissions within the source happen at much lower rates than the reactions
producing 4.5 MeV gamma rays; therefore, significant activities above this energy are not
associated with established PuBe emission spectra [85]. Measurements taken with the
source removed show no activity in this energy region, and the dead time divided by the
live time for these measurements was 1%; pulse pileup is a function of this ratio [87]. This
suggests that the higher-energy discrepancies are likely due to pulse pileup. Pulse pileup
occurs when two photons deposit energy into the detector active region within the same
pulse length measurement period (roughly defined by the detector dead-time).
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Figure 15. Comparison of experimental (Exp.) scintillation detector spectrum to MCNP6
simulation (MCNP6 with standard errors) with an F8 tally shows good matching of spectral
features. Pulse pileup accounts for the discrepancy between experimental and simulated
spectra above 4.43 MeV. Free-field measurements show higher count-rates in the Compton
continuum of the 4.43 MeV source emission photon (right axis), as compared to shielded
measurements, as expected due to shield attenuation. Error bars are included for all but the
PuBe gamma source emission lines, which are shown for reference.

Pulse pileup and neutron interactions cause the extension of experimental spectra
into energy regions higher than source emission line at 4.43 MeV. The MCNP6 code
executed here does not calculate pulse pileup, the lack of which is shown at energies higher
than ~5 MeV and in the energy region lower than ~2.5 MeV in Figure 15. However, this
does not alter the dose contribution provided by the MCNP6 F8 tally as total energy is still
deposited into the detector in the simulation. The simulation assumes the gamma line
source emission in Figure 12 is created by the decay of the first and most probable excited
nuclear state of the

12

C* nucleus (4.43 MeV) created in the 9Be(α,n)12C* reaction [85].

Also included are the prevalent gamma decays (at lower energies) of 240Pu and 241Pu [86].
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Figure 16 displays the experimental and MCNP6-derived GPF results. The
extended plot of GPFExp. at energies greater than ~5 MeV represents pulse pileup in the
experiment.

Figure 16. The overlaid gamma protection factors (GPFs) from MCNP simulation (GPFMCNP
in blue) and experiment (GPFExp. in green) show good agreement up to 4.5 MeV. Error bars
indicate standard error by bin. These standard error bars are calculated as the standard
deviation of the photon energy deposited in each bin normalized to the energy of that bin.
Standard deviations of the GPFExp. at higher energies are larger due to low count rates of
pulse pileup events. Above and below the dotted line, at GPF = 1, the shielding either reduces
or increases the dose in the detector depending on the energy of the detected photons. Error
bars are included in this figure.

Figure 16 shows that while the MCNP6 code did not include pulse pileup, GPFMCNP
matches GPFExp. for energies up to 4.5 MeV. High energy contributions are still accounted
for by the higher Compton continuums in the 4 MeV region in the simulation, as would be
observed in a detector absent of pulse pileup. The large error bars of observations taken
above these energies are caused by low detection rates in this region as shown in Figure
15. These low detection rates also mitigate the contributions of these higher energy bins to
overall dose calculations and the associated experimental uncertainty. GPF results
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displayed in Figure 15 are derived from the ratio of dose rates summed over the entire
spectra, Ḋ FF /Ḋ SH . Figure 16 exhibits the importance of shielding against higher energy
gammas (4.43 MeV) and the potential for producing lower energy Compton scattered
photons (< ~1 MeV) due to shielding.
4.5 Neutron Protection Factor Results
Studies into the comparison of experimental and MCNP6 simulated setups have
shown close agreement between NPFMCNP6 and NPFExp. [88, 34]. Here, the NPF value is
derived from an MCNP6 simulation using the experimental setup in Figure 14. Dose is
calculated by extracting results from an F4:n flux tally. Dose is derived from a log-log
interpolation of neutron flux-to-dose conversion tables provided in ICRP 74 [61].
Dose results, displayed in Figure 17, show that dose is imparted by both neutron
absorption (at lower energies) and scattering (at higher energies). Figure 17 also shows that
the shield had mediocre qualities for neutron dose reduction as exhibited in the NPFMCNP6,
which is qualitatively expected given the thickness and material makeup of the shield.
Interestingly, the dose with shield is increased at lower energies (< ~1 MeV) due to neutron
down-scattering and subsequent absorption. However, the larger flux of higher energy
neutrons dominates the neutron protection factor as NPFMCNP6 > 1.
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Figure 17. The neutron equivalent dose for free-field and shielded cases derived from the
MCNP6 simulation of the experimental setup in Figure 11. The neutron protection factor
(right axis) shows that presence of the shield actually increases dose for energies lower than
~1 MeV. Standard errors are included for all data but are smaller than the data points
displayed.

4.6 Combined Radiation Protection Factor
The combined RPF value is an important metric of the dose reduction provided by
a given shield in mixed gamma/neutron radiation fields. We calculate the RPF value with
dose rates derived from the MCNP6 simulation of the experimental arrangement in Figure
17. The combined RPF is calculated using Equation 10 and results in an RPF = 1.187 ±
0.003. While it appears that the RPF value can be alternatively calculated by averaging the
NPF and GPF values, this will only yield the correct RPF value if shielded neutron and
gamma doses are the same or when the GPF and NPF values are the same.
4.7 Conclusion
This paper explores a new, simple, and experimentally verifiable method for
determining RPF values of shielding geometries and materials, which has applications in
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understanding mass-limited shielding effectiveness for military and civilian applications.
For the specific scenario presented, a mixed neutron/gamma radiation field was examined
using a PuBe source, providing additional verification of MCNP6 code’s ability to
accurately model shielding physics. Experimental and simulated GPF values are compared
and it was shown that spectral discrepancy due to pulse pileup in the detector does not
affect GPF value calculation. A simulated NPF was studied and the combination of gamma
and neutron dose rates to calculate a combined RPF value from simulation was determined.
Future work includes additional validation of the MCNP6 code against experiment
using other neutron and gamma sources, more complex shielding scenarios, and examining
the contributions of neutron-activated gamma rays in the air and shielding around the
target. These future studies will support research into more complex and dynamic
scenarios, such as a nuclear burst, response to a nuclear or radiological accident, or some
space radiation applications.
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V. The Gamma Emission Spectrum from the Fast Burst Reactor
This chapter was published as a paper in the Journal of Radiation Effects in April
2019: W.J. Erwin, E. Cazalas, A. Cahill, J.A. Clinton, J.W. McClory, A.W. Decker,
“The Gamma Emission Spectrum from the Fast Burst Reactor,” Journal of Radiation
Effects, Research and Engineering, vol. 37, no. 1, pp. 50-56, April 2019.
5.1 Abstract
During operation, the Fast Burst Reactor (FBR) at White Sands Missile Range
(WSMR) emits high photon fluxes that saturate spectrometers, thereby degrading gamma
measurements. Additionally, the measured gamma spectrum during shutdown is
substantially different from the gamma spectrum emitted during operation due to changes
to reactor geometry during shutdown. Monte Carlo N-Particle (MCNP) simulations have
characterized the FBR’s prompt gamma spectrum, but this spectrum has not previously
been experimentally verified and validated. In this research, three methods were employed
to reduce scintillation detector saturation and dead time: using a smaller detector, operating
the reactor at the lowest maintainable power, and using shielded spectrometers to reduce
gamma fluxes. To reduce spectral differences in background radiation associated with the
shutdown of the reactor, the shutdown procedures were altered, resulting in a shutdown
state geometrically similar to the reactor’s operational state. Measured operating spectra
are compared to MCNP simulations of the prompt gamma emissions from the reactor and
neutron-gamma interactions in the materials surrounding the detector.
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5.2 Introduction
The Fast Burst Reactor (FBR) has been used for evaluating radiation effects from
unmoderated fission sources. Spectroscopic techniques for evaluating the reactor’s neutron
flux have included neutron activation analysis and Bonner sphere spectroscopy. Although
the neutron energy spectrum emitted by the FBR has been characterized by
experimentation and modeling [82, 34, 88], the reactor’s prompt gamma energy spectrum
has generally only been characterized by modeling [38, 36, 89]. The shape of this prompt
gamma spectrum is important for improving experimental designs, shielding
considerations, accurate radiation modeling, and understanding and interpreting
experimental results.
This research is an experimental investigation of the FBR’s operating gamma
output and a comparison between the experimental results and Monte Carlo N-Particle ver.
6 (MCNP6) simulations of the FBR’s prompt gamma emission spectrum [83].
5.3 Background
As a bare metallic reactor with very high enrichment, the FBR is frequently used to
approximate weapon-like energy distributions of ionizing radiation. As such, its gamma
energy spectrum is important for understanding the effectiveness of shielding personnel
against the prompt radiation from a nuclear burst. Understanding the energy distribution of
gamma rays from a fission weapon is also important for modeling weapon effects. For
instance, models of high altitude electromagnetic pulse use prompt gammas emitted by a
nuclear burst as an input, and typically approximate this distribution to a single energy [90]
[91] [92]. A validated prompt gamma spectrum could allow for a more realistic set of inputs
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to such simulations. Finally, given NASA’s interest in Kilo-power, a project creating
reactors of similar composition and enrichment for deep space missions [93],
understanding the operating gamma spectrum of a similar reactor is important for shielding
personnel and equipment from the ionizing radiation of such reactors.

Figure 18 Top: MCNP5 tally of the prompt gamma flux spectrum across the surface of the
FBR, recreated from data provided by the Survivability, Vulnerability & Assessment
Directorate, WSMR. Bottom: MCNP pulse height tally from a simulation transporting the
top spectrum into a small LaBr3 detector. Uncertainties were 8.6·10-9 counts/MeV-s or below
for energys bin of both tallies.

The simulated prompt gamma emission spectrum from the surface of the FBR is
shown in Figure 18, along with the results of a simulation transporting this spectrum into
a scintillation detector. As shown in the bottom of Figure 18, high photon energies have
low probabilities of full energy deposition. The detector modeled was a cylindrical LaBr3
crystal with a radius of 0.75 inches and a length of 2 inches that modeled the device used
in experimental measurements.
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Gamma ray energy deposited in a detector during and immediately after FBR
operation comes primarily from three sources: prompt gamma emissions from the reactor,
neutron-gamma interactions in the environment, and fission product decay gamma
emissions. The total gamma spectrum can be expressed as a summation of these
constituents:
𝑮𝑮𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑻𝒂𝒂𝒍𝒍 = 𝑮𝑮𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷 + 𝑮𝑮𝒏𝒏𝒏𝒏 + 𝑮𝑮𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫 .

(11)

A rearrangement of this equation indicates the three components needed to produce
an experimentally-derived basis for validating the modeled prompt gamma spectrum is
𝑮𝑮𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷 = 𝑮𝑮𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑻 − 𝑮𝑮𝒏𝒏𝒏𝒏 − 𝑮𝑮𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫 .

(12)

Determining each contributing component of Equation 12 entails unique challenges.
The high-flux radiation environment in the reactor chamber during operation results
in large dead times and makes measuring 𝐺𝐺𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 difficult. Previous measurements of
gamma spectra 12 feet from the FBR yielded dead-times of 100% (3 × 3 inch NaI, at 1 W
reactor power) and 19.3% (0.75 × 2 inch LaBr3, at 0.5 W reactor power).
Measuring 𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 poses problems due to the dynamic geometry of the reactor’s

conventional shutdown procedure. Previous attempts to measure the gamma spectrum

immediately after shutdown assumed that the reactor’s output from decay radiation would
be the same in its operational state as in its conventional shutdown state.
The FBR consists of three primary fuel components: a stack of rings, a central
cylinder known as the “safety block,” and three control rods. All three fuel components are
enriched to over 90% 235U. These components are configured as shown in Figure 19. When
operating, the safety block is fully inserted and control rods are partially inserted to regulate
60

the power of the reactor. The standard shutdown procedure is to lower the safety block out
of the center of the reactor, bringing the assembly to a subcritical state and quickly halting
the neutron chain reaction. Previous efforts to measure the prompt gamma spectrum of the
FBR have been attempted by taking a spectrum with the reactor operating and then taking
another spectrum immediately after shutdown.

Figure 19. A simplified diagram of the FBR fuel elements in operating and shut down
geometries.

This approach yielded spectral features due to the dynamic geometry of the FBR.
Because of its central location within a reactor of uniform enrichment, the neutron flux and
density of fissions is highest inside the safety block. Therefore, the highest concentration
of fission fragments and their daughter products is found in the safety block. When the
reactor shuts down, the act of lowering the safety block exposes these higher concentrations
of radioactive isotopes that are shielded by the rings during operation. Gamma rays from
longer-lived isotopes such as

137

Cs are therefore more prominent in the reactor chamber

with the reactor shut down than when the reactor is operating. This results in the spectral
features in the prompt gamma spectrum shown in Figure 20, which displays an
approximation of 𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 as 𝐺𝐺𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 − 𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 . For the purposes of this research, this is
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called an “operating gamma spectrum” or “experimental prompt gamma spectrum,”
although it includes some decay gammas associated with the time required for reactor
shutdown, and should not be confused with a true prompt gamma spectrum, which is
generally limited to emissions happening within a microsecond of an individual fission.
Gamma rays from neutron interactions outside the reactor are not included in the
prompt gamma emission spectrum from reactor simulations, as they depend upon the
geometry and materials in the reactor’s environment which vary from experiment to
experiment. While 𝐺𝐺𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 is difficult to experimentally isolate from the prompt gamma

emissions, it can be approximated using MCNP6 simulations combined with experimental
neutron measurements of the reactor.

Figure 20. A measurement of the prompt gamma rays produced by the FBR. This was created
by subtracting the spectrum taken immediately after a standard shutdown from the spectrum
taken while the reactor operated at a steady state of 500 mW. Note the large spectral drop
around 0.66 MeV and two minor spectral drops between 1 and 2 MeV. These drops are due
to the subtraction of the more prominent emissions of 137Cs and 60Co in the shutdown
geometry. Uncertainties were 1.3·100 counts/MeV-s or below for each energy bin.

These are the dominant contributors to the gamma flux in the reactor chamber
during operations, but they are not the only sources. However, experimental background
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measurements of the reactor chamber with the reactor removed to its storage bay showed
approximately four orders of magnitude less activity than what was detected during reactor
operation and shutdown measurements, and is therefore not considered significant for the
purposes of this research.
5.4 Methodology
In order to reduce the flux of the 𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 experimental measurement, the reactor

was configured to run at 250 mW, its lowest sustainable level. Unfortunately,

circumstances of a concurrent experiment forced the placement of the detector slightly
closer to the reactor, which resulted in a similar flux of gamma rays into the detector to
those of previous measurement attempts.
To further reduce dead-time in the scintillation detector, a series of tungsten sheaths
was machined to fit tightly around the LaBr3 crystal. These sheaths had thicknesses of 1,
2, and 4 mm. Spectra were collected with the bare detector and each attenuating sheath.
This was intended to reduce the flux of lower-energy gamma rays within the detector and
reduce the dead-time of these measurements by varying degrees, thus improving the quality
of the GPrompt measurement.
In order to eliminate the spectral features associated with previous efforts to
measure GDecay, the reactor’s shutdown procedure was altered. Rather than dropping out
the safety block as in a conventional scram, the control rods were withdrawn to bring the
FBR to a subcritical state. While this change lengthened the FBR shutdown time from less
than 1 second to 30 seconds, this altered procedure resulted in a shutdown geometry that
was similar to the operating state for the purposes of shielding the safety block.
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The simulated gamma emission spectrum of the FBR was used as an isotropic point
source in a multi-step MCNP6 simulation of the reactor chamber. The gamma flux was
tallied entering a representative cell that enclosed a volume around the detector in an initial
simulation; this tally became the source term for simulating the detector and its tungsten
sheaths in subsequent simulations.
While the prompt gamma output of the reactor has not been experimentally
validated, the neutron spectrum of the reactor has been thoroughly investigated and
validated [47, 88]. MCNP6 simulations transported this validated neutron spectrum and
tallied the 𝐺𝐺𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 term, which was normalized using neutron measurements of the reactor. A
second series of simulations replaced the FBR’s gamma emission spectrum with its neutron

emission spectrum and neutron-gamma interactions in the environment were tracked. Both
neutrons and gamma rays were tallied entering a cell enclosing the detector and the air
within 12 inches of the detector in an initial simulation. This tally became the source term
for simulating the detector and its tungsten sheaths. The yielded tallies of gamma
interactions in the detector were solely due to neutron interactions in the environment.
MCNP6 tallies are normalized to the number of source particles in the simulation.
Thus, a simple multiplication of the neutron-gamma simulation tallies by the neutron
emission rate of the reactor yielded an approximation of the time-normalized neutrongamma spectrum (𝐺𝐺𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ). Since the power-dependent prompt gamma emission rate is not

well-defined, the MCNP6 prompt gamma tally’s normalization constant was optimized to
produce a best fit to the experimental data.
Validation of the prompt gamma spectrum was initially done by direct comparison
of the experimentally-derived prompt gamma spectrum of the detector to an MCNP664

modeled transport of the reactor prompt gamma source spectrum into the simulated
detector. This was accomplished by visual inspection of both spectra and by comparing the
relative proportions of key points in their spectra. The energies of these points were
specifically selected to represent regions of dominance for photoelectric absorption,
Compton scattering, and pair production.
An unplanned benefit of using the tungsten sheaths was that each sheath thickness
provided an additional point of comparison between the MCNP6 model and measured
spectra. Comparing the attenuation of these models and experiments across the simulated
and experimental spectra provided a basis for validating the higher-energy portion of the
prompt emission spectrum than would otherwise have been possible. Since the tungsten
sheaths were denser than the detector crystal, they could produce significant differences in
count rates of photon energies up to 3 MeV, and due to the attenuation of lower-energy
photons, the lower portion of the thickly-shielded detectors could be attributed to pair
production and scattering of higher-energy photons.
A pulse pileup algorithm was created in MATLAB and applied to modeled spectra
to enable a direct comparison between experimental results and model outputs. This
algorithm consisted of four key steps. First, the algorithm randomly sampled time intervals
between successive pulses based on the detection rate associated with that experimental
spectrum until the combined time interval exceeded the per-event dead time of the
detection system’s multi-channel buffer. Second, the algorithm sampled energies for each
of these pulses. Third, a Gaussian distribution was applied to each pulse over the time
interval as a function of time, according to the measured pulse shape and width in the
detection system. These Gaussian pulses were summed over the interval, effectively
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simulating a snapshot of an oscilloscope window connected to the detection system.
Finally, the algorithm would find and report the first peak, while ignoring all subsequent
peaks, similar to a multichannel buffer. This algorithm would then be repeated to construct
a simulated spectrum that accounted for the effects of pulse pileup.
5.5 Experimental Results
Both the reduction in reactor power and the use of tungsten sheaths reduced
experimental dead times to varying degrees as shown in Table 2. While the residual
presence of dead times from 8% to 18% from decay gammas could be reduced with a fresh
fuel load or by scheduling this experiment after a lengthy period of inactivity for the
reactor, this was not feasible for the purposes of this experiment.
Table 2. Dead-time percentages for each experimental observation. Shutdown dead-times
are of the reactor in its modified shutdown state with the safety block still inside.

The experimental prompt gamma spectra collected lacked the spectral features seen
in earlier efforts to measure the operating gamma output of the FBR, as shown in Figure
21. This is consistent with the hypothesis that these anomalies were due to reduced
shielding of the fission fragment gamma rays in the safety block in the FBR’s standard
shutdown. Thicker tungsten sleeves caused lower detected activities, particularly at lower
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energies. This is consistent with the lower activity and dead times of these observations
and well-known theory of high-energy photon flux attenuation through shielding media.
The modeled prompt gamma spectra shared a similar overall shape with their experimental
counterparts.

Figure 21. A comparison of prompt gamma spectra from the FBR measured with different
sheath thicknesses. Each spectrum was produced by subtracting the modified shutdown
spectrum from a spectrum taken during 250 mW steady state operation. Uncertainties were
1.1·100 counts/MeV-s or below for all spectra displayed.

5.6 Dead Time Reduction
Dead time reduction was successful to varying degrees depending on the reactor
power level and the presence and thickness of a tungsten sleeve, as shown in Table 2. While
operating the reactor at lower power helped to minimize dead-times, the shutdown state
radiation of the reactor could not be effectively reduced within the experimental timeframe.
Thus, even with the reactor shut down, the bare detector still showed significant dead time
that required tungsten sheath attenuation for further reduction.
Additionally, while previous measurements of the prompt gamma spectrum
indicated a high level of lower-energy gamma rays, much of this lower-energy activity in
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the detector was revealed to be from high-energy gamma rays undergoing Compton scatter
inside the detector. This is demonstrated in Figure 21, which shows a significant decrease
in detected photons less than 1 MeV when tungsten sheaths of any thickness are used.
Smaller decreases are measured with decreasing thicknesses of the tungsten sheaths. This
is consistent with the dead times reported in Table 2, where one millimeter of tungsten
reduced the dead times by approximately 30%, while a sheath four times thicker reduced
the dead times by 40%.
5.7 Modeling the Prompt Gamma Spectrum
The three strategies employed in MCNP6 and post-processing yielded spectra
similar to the experimental prompt gamma spectra as shown in Figure 22. The two-step
modeling approach reduced the computational requirements of the simulations by 71%,
eliminating the need to repeat the initial simulation for each of the four simulated spectra.
The built-in Gaussian broadening feature in MCNP modeled spectral peak broadening due
to detector resolution.
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Figure 22. Comparison of experimental spectra (top) and modeled spectra (bottom).
Uncertainties were 1.1·100 counts/MeV-s or below for the experimental spectra and 4.3·10-1
counts/MeV-s or below for the modeled spectra.

While the shapes of the spectra in Figure 22 are similar, a close examination shows
one major difference. The experimental bare detector plot shows noticeably higher count
rates than the measurements taken with tungsten sheaths at energies below ~1 MeV. In the
modeled spectra, this difference is noticeable just under ~0.5 MeV and rises more sharply
as the energy of the interaction decreases. This difference, as well as other, smaller
differences between the modeled and experimental spectra, may be attributable to two
sources of experimental gamma emissions that are not included in the prompt gamma
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model: neutron-gamma interactions and fission fragment products which decay in
significant proportions between the measurement taken with the reactor operating and the
end of the measurement taken after shutdown.
5.8 N-Gamma Simulations
The n-gamma simulations yielded spectra dramatically different from the
experimental measurements. As shown in Figure 23, the simulated n-gamma spectra of the
sheathed detectors yielded significantly more gamma interactions than the bare detector ngamma simulation. Neutron interactions in the tungsten sheaths create more n-gamma
interactions than air, and as the sheath gets thicker, the n-gamma contribution grows.

Figure 23. Simulated gamma spectra in the detector resulting from n-gamma interactions.
Uncertainties for these spectra were 1.6·10-9 keV/kg-or below.

The inversion of the observed experimental spectra, as a function of sheath
thickness, is consistent with n-gamma interactions being a small minority contributor to
the overall experimental prompt gamma spectrum measured. Accurately combining the n70

gamma spectrum with the prompt is impractical, as the n-gamma simulations are
normalized to the number of source neutrons, while the prompt gamma spectrum provided
was not, and the simulation that produced the prompt gamma emission spectrum is not
available. The particularly low contribution of n-gammas under 1 MeV in the unshielded
spectrum indicates that n-gamma contributions do not account for the noticeable
discrepancy between the bare modeled spectrum and its experimental counterpart. Thus
applying any normalizing constant to the n-gamma spectra and adding it to the prompt
gamma spectra does not yield a better fit to the experimental data, and makes the
comparison worse if the n-gamma contribution is more than two orders of magnitude
smaller than the prompt gamma contribution. This source of gamma rays is therefore not a
significant contributor to the total gamma spectrum measured.
5.9 Short-Term Decay Gammas
Due to both the modified shutdown procedure and the need to collect sufficient
counting statistics in the experimental post-shutdown spectra, the experimental decay
spectrum was measured for approximately 2 minutes once the operational spectrum
measurement ended. The MCNP model of the FBR’s prompt gamma output models
gammas produced within about a microsecond of fission. Thus any radioactive nuclei
produced by fissions that decay away more than 10% within those 2 minutes are not
included in the prompt gamma simulations. Measurements of post-fission spectra over time
have been the subject of several studies [94, 95, 96]. Since these spectra are of other
reactors, these measurements are of limited quantitative utility in this work, but can be
qualitatively studied to show the importance of shorter-lived decay gammas. Evaluations
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of short-lived gamma data suggest high gamma ray detection fluxes in the ~0.5 to ~1.5
MeV range at 128 seconds after 235U fissions [94, 95], which could account for the large
discrepancy between the modeled bare prompt gamma spectrum and its experimental
counterpart in our work.
5.10 Conclusion
The experimental method eliminated geometry-related spectral anomalies and
reduced dead time within the detector. The modeled prompt gamma spectra share the same
general characteristic shape as their experimental counterparts. Discrepancies between the
modeled prompt gamma spectra and the experimental prompt gamma spectra are likely due
to short term decay following the reactor’s shutdown.
A more robust validation of the modeled prompt gamma spectrum will require
additional measurements and models to account for these short-term decay gamma rays.
Additional steps that would improve the quality of such a validation would be to increase
the distance from the reactor to the detector, use a larger detector to increase the counting
efficiency of high-energy gamma rays, and evaluate the reactor with a fresher load of fuel
or after an extended shutdown period.
The tungsten sheath technique used in this evaluation could be used for more than
reducing dead time and providing multiple points of comparison. By building a response
function library with a set of these sheaths, a spectral unfolding algorithm could provide
information about high-energy flux environments using small detectors that are inefficient
at capturing high-energy gamma rays by themselves.
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VI. Radiation Protection Factors with the Fission Spectrum of a
Nuclear Weapon
This chapter describes work towards the verification and validation of MCNP6 for
producing RPFs using sources with a fission spectrum from a bare, un-moderated metal
uranium reactor and a fission-only nuclear weapon, as well as a comparison of different
RPF calculation methods. The fission spectrum introduces three additional challenges for
validation. First, fission energy distributions of neutrons and gamma rays make modeling
more complicated than sources with discrete energies. Second, experimental fission
sources are difficult to characterize as gamma ray emitters, since their emission spectra are
a function of both ongoing fission activity and decay radiation from the daughter products
of past fission activity, and isolating prompt gamma emissions of fission from decay
radiation experimentally requires controlling these confounding variables experimentally.
Finally, calculating RPFs from a fission source at distances appropriate for a nuclear
weapon requires large-scale simulations. This chapter describes three efforts to mitigate
these difficulties and the results of these efforts.
6.1 Gamma Protection Factor Validation Study
As discussed in Chapter 2, a GPF is a unit-less ratio of the dose (D) or dose rate
(Ḋ ) in a free-field (FF) measurement to a measurement taken within a shielding enclosure

(SH) in an otherwise identical radiation field. We will use dose rate as in Equation 13,
taken from the Army’s RPF evaluation of the M113 armored personnel carrier [82].
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𝑫𝑫

(13)

𝑮𝑮𝑮𝑮𝑮𝑮 = 𝑫𝑫𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭

𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺

The GPF can be broken into constituent gamma components of prompt gamma (γ) radiation
from the reactor, neutron-gamma (nγ) interactions in the environment, and decay radiation
from the reactor. Since decay radiation emitted by a reactor can vary significantly
depending on the recent operational history of that reactor, and since the most acute source
of dose from a nuclear weapon is from its prompt effects, only the components associated
with prompt radiation from ongoing fission in the reactor are calculated for the purposes
of validation. Thus, for the purposes of this research, these are the only sources of gamma
rays included in Equation 14.
𝑫𝑫

+𝑫𝑫

𝑮𝑮𝑮𝑮𝑮𝑮 = 𝑫𝑫 𝜸𝜸,𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭+𝑫𝑫𝒏𝒏𝒏𝒏,𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭
𝜸𝜸,𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺

𝒏𝒏𝒏𝒏,𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺

(14)

Gamma-based experiments to measure GPF values consisted of several series of
measurements with a LaBr (lanthanum bromide) detector in shielded and free-field setups.
Each series used bare detector measurements along with measurements taken with the
detector surrounded by tungsten sleeves with thicknesses of 1 mm, 2 mm, and 4 mm. These
sleeves heavily attenuated lower-energy gamma rays and provided a basis for validating
the dose contributions of the higher-energy gamma rays from the reactor.
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Figure 24. Photograph of the double-layered shielded setup. Shielding panels facing the
camera have been removed to show the placement of the detector and its 4mm tungsten
sleeve.

The experimental shielded setup reproduced in MCNP6 is shown in Figure 24 for
a gamma field measurement. The experiments and models compared three different
shielding configurations. The double shield configuration included both the inner and outer
steel enclosures, the outer shield configuration included the outer steel enclosure only, and
the free field setup had no steel enclosures around the detector. In all three configurations,
spectra were measured and simulated with no tungsten sleeve, as well as with 1mm, 2mm,
and 4mm tungsten sleeves.
The source was modeled with a prompt gamma emission spectrum produced by
White Sands Missile Range (WSMR) models of the FBR. This source term’s spectrum had
been verified as being similar to experimental observations in previous research [97].
However, this prompt gamma spectrum had not been experimentally validated for
producing MCNP-based GPFs, and it did not account for neutron-gamma interactions
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outside the FBR, gamma radiation associated with radioactive decay of neutron activation
products in the room, or decay gammas from fission fragments and short-lived daughter
products within the FBR.
The methodology of this experiment was meant to eliminate as much as was
practical of the FBR’s gamma spectrum that was not associated with ongoing fission. To
this end, each experimental gamma spectrum was produced by this process: the gamma
spectrum was measured for 100 seconds with the FBR running at 250 mW, the reactor was
shut down, and then the gamma spectrum was then measured for 100 seconds. After
normalizing both measurements for time, the shutdown spectrum was subtracted from the
250 mW spectrum.
Some adjustments to the FBR’s shutdown procedure were necessary to eliminate
changes in spectra associated with the changing geometry of the FBR during normal
shutdown. Rather than physically separating the central “safety plug” component from the
rest of the FBR, the neutron chain reaction was stopped via manipulation of control rods.
The chain reaction took approximately 30 seconds to drop to 1% of its operating neutron
flux, at which point the post-shutdown measurement began. The time interval between the
initiation of reactor shutdown and the end of the subsequent shutdown spectrum
measurement was approximately 130 seconds.
In order to validate the ability of MCNP6 to produce reliable GPF estimates, an F8
pulse-height tally recorded the energy deposited by photon interactions within the
simulated detector. Binned by energy, the simulated spectra were compared to
experimental measurements. Representations of dose were calculated for both the resulting
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experimental spectra and the modeled spectra by multiplying bin count by bin energy for
both simulation and experiment in Equation 15.
𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫 =

∑𝒏𝒏=𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎
𝒏𝒏=𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎 𝑬𝑬𝒏𝒏 ×𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝒏𝒏
𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕

(15)

In Equation 15, En is the energy of the nth bin, Countn is the count for the nth bin, and min
and max are minimum and maximum bins for an energy interval selected. In this case, the
energy interval selected was between 30 keV and 1.5 MeV.
6.2 Gamma Protection Factor Results
The top two plots in Figure 25 shows the results of experiment and simulation. A cursory
inspection shows that, for each tungsten sleeve thickness, the GPF increases as the steel
enclosure shield thickness increases for both experimental and modeling results, which is
consistent with established photon transport theory.

However, several discrepancies

between modeled and experimental GPFs become apparent with closer inspection and the
side-by-side comparison of the bottom plot of Figure 25.
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Figure 25. Experimental GPFs (left), modeled GPFs (right). And a side-by-side comparison
of the 1mm and 2mm GPFs (below). The red and green bars’ shields were outer steel boxes.
Statistical error bars in all cases are too small to show at these scales.

The GPF values obtained by modeling were consistently higher than those from
experimentation. Although increasing tungsten sleeve thickness also increased the GPF
values in the double-shielded experimental results, it did so to a markedly less proportional
and less linear degree than in the MCNP models. Furthermore, increasing tungsten sleeve
thickness did not consistently increase the GPF value in the experimental results of the
unshielded and outer-shielded experimental results. These discrepancies are consistent
with discrepancies with measured vs. modeled dose deposition spectra as shown in Figure
26.
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Figure 26. Comparison of unshielded dose spectra between the free field configuration with
no sleeve and the double shield configuration with the 4mm sleeve for experiments (above)
and MCNP6 (below). Uncertainties for the Experimental Dose Spectra are 2.1·102 keV/kgkeV and below for the free field, unsleeved detector, and 7.2·101 keV/kg-keV and below for
for the 4mm double sleeved detector. Uncertainties for the MCNP Dose Spectra are 1.1·10-5
keV/kg-keV and below for the free field, unsleeved detector, and 0.5·10-5 keV/kg-keV and
below for the 4mm sleeve double shielded detector.
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Both the experimental and modeling results indicate significant per-bin attenuation
by the double shield and tungsten sleeves. However, the ratio of the modeled dose per unit
energy of the free field measurement to the shielded and sleeved dose per unit energy
remains steady at approximately 4.5 to 1 for most of the energy range, whereas the same
ratio decreases from 3 to 1 at 150 keV to 1.5 to 1 at 1500 keV.
Several alternate modeling approaches were attempted to rule out other
contributing factors. In the initial MCNP simulations, electron transport was disabled and
MCNP produced subsequent x-ray radiation and dose using the approximation that these
occur at the point where the high-energy photon interacts with an electron. Follow-up
modeling with electron transport enabled a similar result as in the initial simulation to be
produced. Using an alternate prompt gamma modeled spectrum from the Army Pulse
Radiation Division Reactor, which was functionally similar to the FBR, also yielded
similar results to the modeled spectra presented.
A final modeling attempt to measure the post-fission gamma spectra as a source
term in order to simulate the experimental gap between the operating and shutdown spectra
was conducted. Adjusting the original simulations’ results by subtracting these short-term
modeled spectra from the original prompt gamma spectra failed to improve the gap
between experimental and observed GPFs.
6.3 Analysis of Discrepancies
The similarity of modeled GPF results with different source spectra and transport
modes engaged indicates that the observed discrepancies between the models and
experimental observations are more due to experimental conditions than modeling issues.
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As stated in the background section, the experimental measurements are an
approximation of the radiation field emitted by active fissions in the FBR. While N-gamma
contributions were determined to be negligible for LaBr measurements of the FBR in
previous research [97], decay gammas from fission fragments, neutron activation products
in the chamber, and daughter products are not fully accounted for, as all isotopes with a
half-life on the order of a minute or less were not eliminated from the experimental prompt
gamma emission spectrum. Since the reactor took approximately 30 seconds to shut down,
and the decay radiation from the reactor attenuated over the subsequent 100 second
observations, the shutdown spectra was an average of measured radiation between 30 and
130 seconds after the reactor began its shutdown. Measurements of post-fission product
radiation from 235U over 128 seconds indicate elevated count rates in the ~0.5 MeV to 1.5
MeV range [95]. Compton scattering other photon interactions in this energy range, and
Compton scattering tends to manifest with a small peak-to-Compton edge ratio. Compton
interactions in the steel shielding enclosure and tungsten cups will increase the tally rates
of scattered photons in detectors. The elevated count rates in the lower energy regions of
the sampled interval will tend to decrease the relative dose contribution of the higherenergy prompt gamma spectrum. Additionally, transporting these decay gammas from 235U
fission within the FBR is difficult, as this requires detailed information on the FBR’s
internal structure and its fission density distribution. For security reasons, WSMR does not
share its reactor models.
Even with a full model of the FBR and a better accounting of post-fission decay
gamma rays and their origination point, the FBR has been an active research reactor for
decades, and fully accounting for its decay gamma activity would require a complete
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operational history of the reactor and its components, including when each component has
been part of the operational reactor, how long each activation took, and the fission rates for
each activation. This is not a viable option for further work, as it would require even more
technical details on the FBR than an MCNP6 model would provide, and WSMR does not
share MCNP6 models of the FBR. In any case the FBR and its associated systems were
designed to run in supercritical pulses and steady-state fission rates of up to 8 kW, and its
decay radiation is an inconsequential contributor to experiments conducted at those fission
rates.
6.4 Summary of GPF Validation Study with the FBR
The experimental and MCNP6 GPFs tend to show the same general trends for
varied shield enclosures at all tungsten sleeve thicknesses evaluated. This is consistent with
the GPF calculation method and model for a distributed-energy source. However, the
inability to experimentally account for short-term decay gammas after shutdown
constitutes a confounding variable that cannot be accounted for without detailed
information about the design, makeup, and operational history of the reactor, and that
information is unavailable. Thus, specific GPF values for shielding geometries against
fission sources cannot be validated using this experimental approach.
In order to properly verify MCNP6’s ability to model GPFs from a distributed
photon source, a different source is required. This could be achieved via a high-energy xray source or by a detailed validation study of Compton-scattered radiation from
radioisotopes.
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6.5 Radiation Protection Factor Methodologies
As discussed in Chapter 2, an RPF is a unit-less ratio meant to express the health
benefit of a shielded environment vs. an unshielded environment in an otherwise identical
radiation field. However, different health effects require different calculations. Short-term
deterministic health effects, such as acute radiation syndrome, are determined by the
absorbed dose, which is measured in rads or grays. Long-term stochastic effects, such as
cancer, are determined by dose equivalent or equivalent dose, and these are calculated as
rems roentgen equivalent man (rem) or sieverts, respectively. These calculations use
weighting factors depending on the type and energy of the ionizing particle. In the case of
gamma radiation, rad and rem are equivalent, as are gray and sievert. However, in the case
of neutron radiation, the energy of incident neutrons determines a weighting factor
according to standards published ICRP reports [15].
Thus, an RPF calculation method may require adjustment depending upon the
scenario. For example, soldiers subjected to nuclear attack will likely be concerned with
short-term effectiveness and survivability far more than long-term cancer risks.
Conversely, those same soldiers responding to a radiological emergency that doesn’t
require immediate lifesaving actions are likely to be primarily concerned with long-term
cancer risks. If RPFs for a given radiation field vary to a degree that could affect operational
decisions depending on the use of absorbed dose units vs. equivalent dose units, than any
product that communicates such RPFs should explain this difference.
While there is no difference between the absorbed gamma dose and its equivalent
dose, there are multiple modeling approaches that may result in different calculated RPF
values. MCNP6 has the ability to model direct dose depositions in a given object using a
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pulse height tally [78]. When a simulated gamma ray interacts in the tallied cell, the
randomly sampled interaction energy is tallied within the energy bin with which it is
associated. With sufficient counting statistics in enough energy bins, MCNP6 can
approximate the spectrum of gamma energy deposited in the object, which can later be
summed into an absorbed dose normalized to the number of source particles in a given
simulation [78]. This approach offers the benefit of simulating photon interactions in a
detector which can be directly compared to a spectrometer.
An alternate approach for calculating gamma dose is to tally all simulated gamma
rays crossing into a cell of interest. Using an exposure-dose conversion calculation for each
energy bin and summing the result produces a dose normalized to the number of simulated
particles. While this result cannot be experimentally validated by spectroscopic
measurements, it offers two key benefits. First, it is more computationally efficient to
model, since all gamma rays that cross into the cell of interest get tallied. Second, it
approximates the dose a human being might absorb when exposed to the radiation field
being simulated using the same assumptions of the proportionality of flux and dose as the
widely-used 6CEN formula [15].
One additional concern for computing gamma doses for RPF evaluations is
selecting an appropriate cell to tally. If a single RPF is to consider both neutrons and
gamma rays in a way that can be experimentally validated, then both neutron and gamma
simulations should reflect their experimental counterparts and will therefore tally gamma
rays and neutrons in cells of different sizes and compositions. If no experimental validation
is necessary, then both simulations can tally neutron and gamma radiation into a common
cell geometry and composition. If tally cells yield markedly different RPF values due to
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different sizes and compositions, then experimental validations of RPFs that use detectors
of different sizes and compositions are less likely to adequately model doses from different
radiation types and subsequent RPF values.

Procedure
In order to evaluate these considerations, a series of four shielding scenarios were
modeled using neutron and prompt gamma spectra from the Fast Burst Reactor (FBR) of
White Sands Missile Range. In all cases, the centroid of the shielding enclosure and/or
radiation detector was 8 feet from the operating reactor. The first was a free field simulation
of the radiation field. The second was a field within a 2 ft x 2 ft x 2ft cubic steel enclosure
with a thickness of 1 in. The third replaced a ½ in thickness of the steel with a layer of
polyethylene and aluminum. The fourth used the 1 in steel box and added an additional 18
inch x 18 inch x 18 inch steel box inside the original. All neutron simulations tallied
neutrons entering a 12 inch diameter sphere of air about the center point of the boxes.
Gamma simulation tallies were centered about the center of the boxes and either simulated
a 12 inch polyethylene sphere, a 12 inch air sphere, or a 0.75 inch x 2 inch LaBr scintillation
crystal.
Gamma doses were calculated from pulse-height tallies by multiplying each bin’s
energy by the number of interactions tallied at that energy. These products are then summed
to produce a value proportionate to gamma dose as shown in Equation 16:
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𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫 =

∑𝒏𝒏=𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎
𝒏𝒏=𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎 𝑬𝑬𝒏𝒏 ×𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝒏𝒏
𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕

,

(16)

where En is the energy of gamma rays tallied in the nth bin and Countn is the number of
gamma rays tallied in the nth bin. While an actual dose calculation normally includes the
mass of the object absorbing this energy, this mass divides out in GPF calculations, and is
therefore irrelevant.
Gamma doses were also calculated with an adaptation of the 6CEN approximation
for calculating gamma doses as a summation of photon energy, photon fluence for each
photon energy, and spherical divergence as a function of distance from a source. Since the
distance does not vary for the purposes of GPF calculation, a 6CEN-based approximation
of GPF can be calculated using flux data as an input to Equation 16 rather than pulse-height
tally data. An alternative to a 6CEN fluence-to-dose calculation is to incorporate NIST data
for a target of interest such as human tissue [15]. The resulting Equation 17 is similar to
Equation 16 with a fluence-to-dose calculation for each bin,

where

𝜇𝜇𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
𝜌𝜌

𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫 =

𝝁𝝁𝒆𝒆𝒆𝒆
∑𝒏𝒏=𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎
𝒏𝒏=𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎 𝑬𝑬𝒏𝒏 ×𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝒏𝒏 𝝆𝝆
𝟒𝟒𝝅𝝅𝒓𝒓𝟐𝟐

𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕

,

(17)

is the mass energy absorption coefficient divided by the density of the target

material. Since this investigation is comparing dose ratios for scenarios in which the
distance between source and detector is identical, neither the 4πr2 term nor the density have
any effect upon the resulting RPF, as they are identical in the shielded and free field
conditions.
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Neutron stochastic dose calculations apply a log-log interpolation of fluence-todose and fluence-to-equivalent-dose to modeled neutron flux spectra according to Equation
18,
𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫 =

∑𝒏𝒏=𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎
𝒏𝒏=𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎 𝑬𝑬𝒏𝒏 ×𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝒏𝒏 ×𝒘𝒘𝒓𝒓
𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕

,

(18)

where wr is a quality factor that converts the dose in rads or grays deposited by neutrons
of the nth energy bin into a stochastic dose equivalent or equivalent dose of rem or sieverts.
This wr factor varied between 5 and 20 in both ICRP 103 and NCRP 116 at the same
energies in both standards [62, 98], so using either standard was unlikely to yield a
significant difference in predicted stochastic risks. However, the decision of whether or not
to include wr in the calculation may have a significant effect on neutron doses and the
overall RPF in a nuclear attack scenario in which a high fluence of neutrons is expected.
Similar to earlier calculations, this is not a true dose calculation, as it omits the mass of the
detector or target mass. Since this mass does not change, and since RPFs are ratios of dose,
the mass divides out and is therefore irrelevant for the purposes of computing RPFs. Thus,
the value computed is proportionate to the equivalent dose, and that is sufficient for the
purposes of this research.
Once doses per energy bin and dose equivalencies per energy bin from neutron and
gamma fluences were computed for each shielding configuration and calculation scheme,
they were summed. The combined unshielded dose values were then divided by their
corresponding shielded dose values, producing combined radiation protection factors.
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6.6 Gamma Modeling Results
Figure 27 shows the GPFs produced for each simulated shielding scenario and its
respective dose calculation scheme. Flux-based calculations consistently yielded higher
GPFs than their pulse-height-tally equivalents, and this discrepancy was particularly large
for the pulse-height tally of the small detector. Flux-based GPF calculations showed a
slight increase (less than 2% of overall GPF) between the small LaBr3 scintillator and the
much larger Bonner Ball.

Figure 27. GPFs based on pulse and flux calculations for simulations of a LaBr3 scintillator
and a Bonner ball. Due to the large number of summed bins, the uncertainties for these results
are ±0.001, too small to resolve error bars.

The consistently lower GPF for the pulse-height tallied LaBR3 simulations is
consistent with its small size. Higher-energy photons passing through the smaller detector
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are more likely to either not interact at all, or scatter out of the detector without depositing
their full energies than in a larger detector, where full-energy depositions are more likely.

Figure 28. GPFs calculated from MCNP6 pulse-height tallies for the LaBr3 detector (blue)
and the Bonner ball (red) in the double-shield scenario. Uncertainties per bin are
proportionate to the visual fluctuations in these GPFs per bin, approaching a standard error
of 1 as the energy rises above 3 MeV for the LaBr3 detector and 6 MeV for the large Bonner
Ball.

Figure 28 shows that the LaBr3 detector was incapable of detecting protection
provided by the shielding geometries above 5 MeV, and the variance above 2 MeV is
consistent with a lower detector efficiency to be expected from its small size. The larger
and heavier Bonner Ball could detect protection provided up to approximately 13 MeV
gammas, with much tighter variances than the smaller LaBr detector up to 6 MeV. While
these higher-energy photons constitute a small minority of the output of the FBR, their
presence drove the GPF up for the larger detector.
Neutron simulation results yielded similar NPFs for both deterministic and
stochastic calculation methods as shown in Figure 29 (See Table 1 in Chapter 1 for a
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discussion of deterministic and stochastic radiation health effects). However, the stochastic
methods of calculation consistently yielded higher NPFs than deterministic methods. This
gap was smaller for the 1-inch thick steel big box simulation and larger for the complex
box and the 2-inch thick steel box (double box) simulations. This larger gap for thicker
shielding suggests that vehicles with heavy armor and higher RPFs may have a wider
divergence between RPFs calculated by deterministic vs stochastic methods.

Figure 29. NPFs calculated by deterministic methods (blue) and stochastic methods (red) for
three shielding scenarios. Due to the large number of summed bins, the uncertainties for these
results are less than ±0.002 and too small to resolve error bars.

Comparing NPFs per bin is not useful as with the GPF comparison, since the
difference between the two is defined by an energy bin-specific weighting factor. Thus, the
NPFs on a per-bin basis are effectively identical. Instead, it is useful to consider the effect
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of the overall spectral shape of a shielded and unshielded neutron flux spectrum and its
resulting NPF per bin, as shown in Figure 30.

Figure 30. The neutron equivalent dose for free-field and shielded cases from Chapter 4. The
neutron protection factor (right axis) shows that presence of the shield actually increases dose
for energies lower than ~1 MeV. Standard errors are included for all data but are smaller
than the data points displayed. Standard errors are included for all data but are smaller than
the data points displayed.

Since shielding materials tend to moderate fast neutrons more often than absorbing
them outright, they also tend to reduce their wr’s. As Figure 30 demonstrates, the NPF per
bin in a shielding scenario rises above one for neutron energies above 1 MeV but drops
slightly below one for neutron energies under 1 MeV. Since the dose rate per bin at fast
neutron energies is two orders of magnitude higher than at thermal energies, this increases
NPFs calculated via stochastic methods.
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6.7 Analysis and Discussion
In considering how to evaluate an RPF, several priorities should be considered.
Safety-conscious investigators will likely have an understandable tendency to err on the
conservative side of their estimated RPFs, which would indicate using lower-yielding
methods. The downside of such an approach is that this may lead risk managers to
overestimate the impact of radiation vs. other risks.
Another sensible concern is to avoid relying exclusively on simulations and validate
RPF data with calibrated radiation measurements. Choosing to model a detector can
provide a direct basis for validating MCNP6-derived RPFs. However, the significant
differences between a detector and a human body in geometry and materials can create
significant differences between RPFs calculated this way and actual RPFs for a human
being. If an RPF evaluator were to use the gamma scintillator used in this study as
representative of the dose to a human body with a shielding geometry similar to the double
box scenario, that would result in a calculated GPF of approximately 2.7, when the true
GPF would be closer to 3.2. Furthermore, since neutron and gamma spectroscopy
techniques use detectors of different geometries and materials, combining neutron and
gamma doses from measurements introduces systemic error.
Although none of the methods used to simulate and calculate gamma and neutron
protection factors yielded differences greater than 14%, these simulations demonstrate
several consistent trends worthy of consideration in calculating the protection provided by
shields to personnel from neutron and gamma radiation. Pulse-height tallies in MCNP6 are
a useful basis for validating the program’s ability to model gamma radiation transport and
shielding, but the detectors used for such validation should be large enough to capture the
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full spectrum of gamma rays present in the scenario; in contrast, a flux tally is adequate for
evaluating a GPF at the full range of gamma energies that MCNP6 can model. For NPF
calculations, deterministic dose calculation methods yield more conservative protection
factors than do stochastic calculation methods. Since deterministic methods are most
appropriate for scenarios in which acute radiation sickness is the driving concern, they are
best suited for emergency responders and military personnel operating on a nuclear
battlefield.
6.8 Simulating a Nuclear Attack on an Armored Vehicle
In order to assess MCNP6’s ability to simulate a nuclear attack on an armored
vehicle, an attempt was made to model the surface burst of a fission bomb against a Stryker
vehicle using a series of MCNP6 simulations and a geometry created in SWORD. This
attempt used a multi-step methodology to reduce computational requirements. The first
step was a series of gamma and neutron simulations transporting the gamma and neutron
spectrum of a Fat Man device from a detonation point 1 meter off the ground to a distance
of 1400 meters, where a group of annuli tallied the fluxes. The second step was intended
to be a series of simulations transporting the radiation into a SWORD-built prototype
model of a Stryker Vehicle in MCNP6, but the model used was found to have geometry
problems that introduced fatal errors in MCNP6. While future models may resolve this, it
was impractical to find and correct these geometry problems.
Methodology
The Fat Man bomb was chosen for this scenario. This bomb was the original
plutonium implosion design, tested at Trinity and used against Nagasaki at the end of
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World War II. Although there are simpler methods for creating a nuclear bomb, such as a
uranium gun-type device, implosion weapons are suitable to more types of nuclear fuel,
making them a more appropriate choice for a wide variety of potential nuclear-armed
adversaries as a nuclear weapon in tactical or terrorist strikes. The unclassified source
spectra of gamma rays and neutrons for the Fat Man bomb came from DTRA [64].
The burst height of 1m is applicable to multiple plausible scenarios: the tactical
deployment of an atomic demolition munition against the U.S. military, the clandestine
placement of the bomb in a vehicle or small building as a tactical or terrorist strike against
U.S. forces, or the deliberate ground burst of a tactical nuclear weapon in order to achieve
an area denial effect through the generation of a highly radioactive debris and a downwind
fallout hazard. 1400 meters was chosen for this scenario as a distance at which exposed
personnel would likely die from acute radiation syndrome, but personnel inside armored
vehicles might survive. On flat ground, at this distance, according to Glasstone and Dolan,
the dose from such a burst would be 500 Gy [57], a dose at which acute radiation syndrome
would cause approximately 50% lethality, but low enough that an RPF of 2 or more would
mitigate symptoms, delay symptom onset, and result in the crew’s chances of surviving
acute radiation syndrome increasing to 95% [99].
The first step of this attempt was to conduct simulations to transport gamma and
neutron radiation from the site of the nuclear explosion to the distance of the target vehicle.
The MCNP environment for this step consisted of a cylindrical volume of air 400 meters
high and 1500 meters in radius atop a concrete cylindrical slab 0.5 meter thick, which
simulated the ground. The 400 meter height of the air and 1 meter depth of the concrete
were chosen according to the mean free path lengths of 1 MeV gamma rays and neutrons
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in air and concrete. The mean free path of 1 MeV photons in dry air at sea level is 89.0
meters, so 400 meters of vertical space provides in excess of four mean free paths in which
photons can go up and scatter back down. The mean free path of 1 MeV photons in concrete
is 4.45 cm, so 0.5 meters of concrete depth provides more than 10 mean free paths in which
photons can go down and scatter back up. A 1973 cyclotron-based measurement of
ordinary concrete measured the half-value thickness for fast neutrons at 9.75 cm ± 0.75 cm
for ordinary concrete [100]. A half-value layer is the thickness at which the dose rate from
the neutron flux is halved, and since a half-value layer includes a variety of neutron
interactions including absorption and scattering, a half-value layer will always be equal to
or greater than a mean free path. Thus, there are at least five mean free paths of concrete
thickness for neutrons from the explosion to transport down and up on their way to the
tallying cells. In the 1951 OPERATION GREENHOUSE nuclear weapon tests, fast
neutron mean free paths in air were measured as approximately 152 ± 4.5 meters [101].
Thus, the dimensions of the step one simulation transporting gamma and neutron radiation
from the site of the nuclear explosion to the 1400 meter target annuli allow for both gamma
rays and neutrons to move up and down for multiple mean free paths while moving from
the source to annuli that are many mean free paths distant, while eliminating particles that
have moved too far up in air or too far down in concrete to have a statistically significant
chance of scattering back into the annuli of interest. Figure 31 shows cross sections of the
Step 1 simulation geometry.
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Figure 31. Horizontal and vertical cross sections of the Step 1 simulation geometries. All
surfaces are cylinders about the z-axis of the simulation.

Several “killer annuli” dropped the importance of the transported particles to zero,
eliminating them from the simulation. These were used to isolate specific components of
the incident spectra at the target distance depending on the path of the transported particles,
in order to segregate subsequent fluxes into a horizontal flux outward from the explosion
and a downward sky-shine flux. Another annulus was created halfway between the
simulated bomb and the tallying annuli to have the option to kill particles going straight
from the bomb to the tallying annuli with little scattering, but this was found to have little
effect on the tallied spectra, and was therefore not used. Using the annulus approximation
method described in Chapter 3, MCNP6 transported the source spectra of gamma rays and
neutrons to a series of annuli approximately 1400 meters away and tallied them. Figure 32
shows a cross section of the annuli at 1400 meters.
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Figure 32. Cross section of tallying annuli and a killer annulus for Step 1 simulations. All cells
in this image consist of air. Cell 320 is a killer annulus that eliminates all incident photons
from the simulation.

The horizontal tallying annulus was 10 meters tall, but only 1 cm thick; this was
meant to minimize the count rate of particles scattering down from above while
maximizing incident particles coming horizontally from the direction of the nuclear
explosion. Immediately outside the horizontal tallying annulus was a killer annulus that
removed all particles entering it from the simulation. A sky-shine tallying annulus was
placed just outside the killer annulus and made one cm shorter than the killer annulus in
order to prevent horizontal or shallow downward particles from being counted. The skyshine tallying annulus was made 20 meters thick. The 10 meter height and 20 meter length
of these annuli were to be the same as the height and length of the Step 2 simulations. This
combination of annuli allowed for a rough approximation of angular-dependent spectra for
the target vehicle. Since vehicle armor is thicker to the sides than it is on top, this is a
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relevant consideration for shielding and the RPF. These annuli were made to tally the
incident spectra of sky-shine and a combination of direct radiation and ground-shine for a
ground vehicle at this distance. Figure 33 compares the source photon spectrum with the
horizontal and sky-shine tallies.

Figure 33. Photon source spectrum for Fat Man (left), recreated from Holmes [102], and
tallied photons for horizontal gamma fluxes tallied at 1400 meters (right), normalized to the
number of simulated particles, multiplied by the total number of gamma rays emitted by Fat
Man according to Holmes, and then adjusted to account for the difference in area between
the horizontal and sky-shine tally incident surfaces. Note that the scales are different for these
results. Tallied photon counts above 1.5 MeV and below 20 keV were too low to be statistically
significant. Uncertainties for the photon flux spectra are ±5·103 Photons/MeV.

The gamma ray spectra tallied at 1400 meters has several significant differences
from the source spectrum. Whereas the source spectrum shows a large number of gamma
rays up to 4 MeV, the tallied spectra showed no statistically significant tallied gamma rays,
indicating that photons with these energies have attenuated at this distance. Most remaining
photons have energies less than 1 MeV. Additionally, the horizontal gamma flux was a
close match to the sky-shine flux below 120 keV, from 400-500 keV, and from 1.5 keV,
but the horizontal gamma flux exceeded the sky-shine gamma flux by two orders of
magnitude at 200 and 350 keV, and by two to three orders of magnitude from 550 keV to
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1 MeV. Thus, the horizontal tallied flux had both more photons per unit area and higherenergy photons per unit area. Most tactical vehicles have their thickest armor oriented to
the sides of the occupants, which is fortuitous for these incident-angle-dependent trends.

Figure 34. Neutron source spectrum for Fat Man (left), recreated from Holmes [102], and
horizontal and skyshine neutron flux spectra tallied at 1400 meters (right), normalized to the
number of simulated particles, multiplied by the total number of neutrons rays emitted by
Fat Man according to Holmes, and adjusted to account for the difference in area between the
horizontal and sky-shine tally incident surfaces. Note the different scales for these results.
Tallied neutron counts above 1.0 MeV were too low to be statistically significant.
Uncertainties from the neutron flux spectra are ±7·103 Neutrons per MeV.

Figure 34 shows that the trends for the step 1 neutron simulations were similar to
the trends for the step 1 gamma simulations. The horizontal neutron flux was greater in
both incident particles and incident energy than the sky-shine neutron flux, and this was
particularly pronounced between 0.5 and 1 MeV and between 150 and 300 keV.
Overall, step 1 simulations took between 6 and 12 hours on a laptop with 8 i74700MQ CPU cores running simultaneously, with each simulation transporting 1 billion
particles throughout 2.83 billion cubic meters of air and concrete. The ability to transport
statistically significant gamma and neutron fluxes through such a large volume to a distance
of 1400 meters demonstrates the viability of this approach for evaluating large-scale
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nuclear attack. While more computing power and time could help reduce statistical noise
and provide improved energy resolution in the tally surfaces, these results were adequate
to use as inputs for step 2 simulations of a tactical vehicle.
The Stryker vehicle was chosen for step 2, and a new model, built in SWORD by
Naval Research Laboratories, provided a close approximation of the shapes and materials
making up this vehicle. A SWORD model was constructed within a box world volume 10
meters tall and 20 meters wide and long. Two thin parallelepiped plates of air were made
to serve as source regions for the horizontal and sky-shine fluxes, one on the side of the
simulation and one above. A single large sphere within the Stryker was to serve as a tally
cell for gamma rays and neutrons. Figure 35 shows the step 2 simulation geometry prior to
its export into MCNP6.

Figure 35. Visualized geometry of the Step 2 simulations in SWORD.

Unfortunately, the model failed in MCNP6 due to intrinsic geometry errors in the
Stryker vehicle SWORD model which caused approximately 1 in 1,000 particles to be lost.
These losses occurred in areas of the Stryker outside the tallying surface, and with
approximately 3,600 lines of code to parse and cross-check for geometry errors, it was
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impractically difficult to correct the model in MCNP6 or SWORD. Since these loss rates
would have exceeded some of the tallies needed to produce an RPF, these errors prevented
step 2 simulations from enabling RPF evaluations of this model.

6.9 Conclusion
This chapter has presented efforts to model RPFs with the fission spectrum of a
nuclear weapon. Overall, these efforts had mixed results. GPF validation of the fission
spectrum remains elusive due to a source spectrum that yielded modeled GPFs that were
from 27% to 106% higher their experimental counterparts. While work described in
Chapter 5 successfully measured the gamma spectrum of the FBR, more work is needed to
better define this spectrum. This chapter presented an exploration of RPF methodology
choices that could affect how a study might present RPF data to military planners and end
users of tactical vehicles, but the influence of these factors was determined from surrogate
models, not from a model of a tactical vehicle. Finally, the attempt to model a nuclear
attack on a tactical vehicle demonstrated the viability of the annulus approximation, but
problems with the final model precluded Step 2 evaluations, which made the final RPF
evaluation impossible. Thus, the work presented in this chapter, while useful as an iterative
step towards RPF evaluations using MCNP6, does not complete the goals of verifying and
validating MCNP6 for producing RPFs.
These setbacks also provide insight that may be useful for follow-on work. The
methodology used to measure the gamma spectrum of the FBR might be compatible with
unfolding algorithms to produce a source spectrum closer to reality. Evaluating a nuclear
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strike could well be viable with a newer SWORD Stryker model or a SWORD model of
another vehicle.
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VII. Conclusions and Recommendations
7.1 Review of Goals and Objectives
The first goal of this dissertation was to create a RPF evaluation method that uses
experimentally-validated MCNP6 simulations, a method described in Chapter 3 and
accomplished in Chapter 4. As stated in Chapter 1, the supporting objectives of defining
NPF and GPF validation with simple surrogates were accomplished in research leading up
to this dissertation. Chapter 3 replicated both these processes and combined them into a
single RPF value. Chapter 3 also established a procedure for normalizing gamma and
neutron dose components in a simulated scenario by using published source ratios and
efficiency calculations from experimental measurements, the latter of which was
demonstrated in Chapter 4. Chapters 3, 4, and 6 all present procedures for computing doses
and the total RPF value, with Chapters 3 and 4 focusing on experimental validation, and
Chapter 6 addressing the influence of different simulation and calculation methods upon
RPF values.
The second goal was to demonstrate the RPF method on a series of surrogates using a
PuBe source and a nuclear reactor. This was accomplished in Chapters 4, 5, and 6, though
the demonstration of the RPF method on a reactor in Chapter 6 was not completed due to
discrepancies between gamma simulations and measurements. Despite these discrepancies,
the data and simulations provided the first-ever close gamma spectrometer measurements
of the FBR, and the simulations of FBR experiments provided a basis for model-based RPF
method demonstrations on three surrogates.
The final goal, to build a computer model of a Stryker vehicle irradiated by a nuclear
weapon spectrum in SWORD and run it in MCNP6, was accomplished, but geometry
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problems with the model precluded gathering useful information or performing an RPF
evaluation this way.
This dissertation has answered the investigative questions posed in Chapter 1. The
steps involved in producing RPF values for different scenarios were examined and
discussed throughout the dissertation and specifically demonstrated in Chapters 3 and 6.
The reliability of MCNP6 for transporting gamma and neutron radiation and producing
RPFs is highly dependent upon accurate source spectra, but is achievable to an enumerated
degree through the chi-squared test for neutron spectrum unfolding and the statistical
strength and accuracy of gamma ray simulations through the criterion of the 95%
confidence interval being within 5% of an experimental RPF value. Chapter 4 presented
an example of a validated RPF assessment, while Chapter 6 presented and explored issues
that prevented this assessment from fission sources. Chapter 6 also identified and examined
additional consideration and techniques necessary to produce a reasonably reliable RPF
values for a given scenario within practical limits of computational power and time,
specifically with the use of the annulus approximation and multi-step modeling.
7.2 Recommendations
The work verified and validated MCNP6 as a viable tool for computing RPFs with
well-defined gamma and neutron emission spectra. The program can do so without the
expense and difficulty of setting up analogous experiments. Further RPF validations
evaluations in MCNP6 are warranted for nuclear weapon spectra, as well as further
validation work to build confidence in the results of such evaluations. Alternate tactical
vehicle evaluation using SWORD and MCNP6 could allow for an RPF evaluation. If this
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could be done in conjunction with a vehicle irradiation experiment with the FBR, that could
enable experimental validation in the most realistic scenario possible short of an
atmospheric nuclear weapons test.
For such testing to work, however, further evaluations of the FBR’s prompt gamma
spectrum are needed. A more-varied array of tungsten sleeves could provide a basis for
unfolding a source spectrum that better matches experimental results. Alternately, a larger
detector placed at a greater distance, such as during an outdoor test, could provide more
useful information for evaluating the FBR’s emission spectrum. Another approach could
be to take low-power measurements of a fresh, small reactor that uses weapons-grade
uranium as its fuel as it comes online for the first time. Should Nasa’s Kilopower Program
continue in development, testing, and manufacture, these could present opportunities for
such a measurement [103]. Whatever the method, a more credible FBR prompt gamma
source spectrum could in turn provide a basis for another look at validating GPFs with a
fission source without requiring further experimentation. Such a spectrum could also
enable RPF experimental validation with a fission source without requiring further
experimentation.
While the geometry constructed in SWORD did not ultimately work as intended
for this dissertation, the ability to visualize geometry during construction is an invaluable
tool. SWORD’s utility and interface is far superior to the visual editor program, VISED,
that is distributed with MCNP6. The elegance of this pairing is likely to improve as Navy
Research Laboratory continues to develop SWORD and SWORD-built models of military
vehicles. Alternate tactical vehicle evaluations using SWORD and MCNP6 could allow for
an RPF evaluation using models alone. Since un-validated simulations are intrinsically
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suspect, this could be done in conjunction with a future vehicle irradiation experiment with
the FBR. Such an experimental validation would be the most realistic scenario possible
short of an atmospheric nuclear weapons test.
Finally, this RPF work could be applied to aircraft irradiated by terrestrial gamma
flash events, solar particle events, and galactic cosmic radiation to evaluate radiation risks
to military flight operation. Such an effort is currently under way with a multi-way
partnership that includes the United States Air Force School of Aerospace Medicine, the
Air Force Institute of Technology, and Los Alamos National Laboratory, but that effort
does not yet include the role of the aircraft in the transport of radiation from these events.
This would also be closely related to cancer risks in Air Force pilots, the subject of a study
currently pending publication for which this dissertation’s author is also a contributing
author [104], as well as the subject of bill for a DoD-level study currently under
consideration by Congress [105].
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